Adjudication of Federal Causes of Action in State Court by Redish, Martin H. & Muench, John E.
Michigan Law Review 
Volume 75 Issue 2 
1976 
Adjudication of Federal Causes of Action in State Court 
Martin H. Redish 
Northwestern University 
John E. Muench 
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr 
 Part of the Constitutional Law Commons, Courts Commons, and the Jurisdiction Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Martin H. Redish & John E. Muench, Adjudication of Federal Causes of Action in State Court, 75 MICH. L. 
REV. 311 (1976). 
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr/vol75/iss2/5 
 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Michigan Law Review at University of Michigan Law 
School Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Michigan Law Review by an authorized editor 
of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact 
mlaw.repository@umich.edu. 
ADJUDICATION OF FEDERAL CAUSES OF 
ACTION IN STATE COURT 
Martin H. Redish* and John E. Muench** 
Since shortly after the founding of the Republic, it has been well 
established that state courts are obliged to enforce applicable prin-
ciples of federal law when they adjudicate state causes of action.1 
This rule is hardly surprising. If the federal system is to function 
properly, a state court cannot be permitted to ignore federal constitu-
tional and.statutory provisions that conflict with state law. The su-
premacy clause2 does not appear to permit any other practice. 
At the same time, the development of principles concerning the 
power of state courts to hear federal causes of action has been con-
siderably more confused. Although the framers apparently antic-
ipated that state courts would generally be able to adjudicate federal 
causes of action,3 Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, which held that state 
courts must apply federal law when it conflicts with applicable state 
law in state cases, also assumed that state courts were powerless to 
hear federal causes of action. 4 While the Supreme Court eventually 
concluded that state courts generally do possess concurrent jurisdic-
tion with federal courts over federal actions, 5 serious questions have 
lingered concerning when specific federal causes of action are to be 
* Associate Professor of Law, Northwestern University. A.B. 1967, University 
of Pennsylvania; J.D. 1970, Harvard University.-Ed. 
** A.B. 1970, College of the Holy Cross; J.D. 1976, Northwestern University.-
Ed. 
1. See Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304 (1816). 
2. U.S. CoNST. art. VI, cl. 2: 
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in 
Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Au-
thority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land, and the 
Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or 
Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding. 
3. This was apparently the assumption underlying the Madisonian Compromise of 
article Ill, which permitted but did not require -the congressional creation of lower 
federal courts. In reaching this result, the framers assumed that if Congress chose 
not to create lower federal courts, the state courts could serve as trial forums in 
federal cases. See C. WRIGHT, I.Aw OF FEDERAL COURTS 2 (3d ed. 1976); Redish & 
Woods, Congressional Power to Control the Jurisdiction of Lower Federal Courts: A 
Critical Review and a New Synthesis, 124 U. PA.LR.Ev. 45, 52-56 (1975). See also 
1 M. FARRAND, R.EcoRDS OF TIIE FEDERAL CONVENTION 124-25 (1~11); P. BATOR, P. 
MISHKIN, D. SHAPIRO & H. WECHSLER, HART & WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS 
AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM (2d ed. 1973) [hereinafter cited as HART & WECHSLER]. 
4. 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 337 (1816). 
5. Claflin v. Houseman, 93 U.S. 130, 136 (1876). 
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exempted from this presumption of concurrent jurisdiction-in other 
words, which cases are to be heard exclusively in federal court. 
Equally as confused as the state court "power" question has been 
the issue of a state court's "obligation" to hear federal causes of 
action when it does not wish to do so. Subsumed under the "obliga-
tion" issue are two specific problems. First, there remains some 
confusion as to whether the Constitution provides the states with a 
right to protect their courts from being overburdened by congres-
sionally imposed obligations to adjudicate federal cases. Further, it 
remains unclear precisely how the judiciary is to determine under 
what circumstances, if any, Congress has authorized state courts to 
refuse to entertain federal causes of action. 
The answers to these questions may have a significant effect on 
the development of the federal system and the shaping of federal 
rights. On the one hand, widespread state court adjudication of fed-
eral causes of action could do much to alleviate the extremely over-
worked condition of the federal judiciary.6 On the other hand, state 
adjudication of federal rights cannot help but decrease uniformity-
and therefore predictability-in the development of these rights. 
Additionally, authorization of state court adjudication of certain fed-
eral causes of action might threaten the evolution of federal rights 
because state judges often lack the expertise to deal with problems 
unique to federal law. 
The first section of this article considers the power of state courts 
to hear federal cases. Since it is now well established that state 
courts have the constitutional power to adjudicate federal causes of 
action if Congress so desires, the significant questions concern the 
method by which the judiciary is to decipher congressional intent. 
Although the courts have no difficulty where Congress has explicitly 
addressed the issue of state court jurisdiction, problems do arise in 
situations where Congress has remained silent on the question. The 
first section critically examines the traditional criteria employed by 
the courts for determining congressional intent in the face of con-
gressional silence and then suggests a substantial alteration in the 
judiciary's approach to the matter. 
The second section of the article considers the obligation of state 
courts to hear federal cases. After first evaluating constitutional 
questions surrounding such an obligation, this section wilI also ex-
amine difficult questions involving congressional intent-specifically, 
6. See 1973 DIV. OF .ADMIN. OFFICE OF TIIE U.S. CoURTS, ANN. REP. Table 59, at 
219. 
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the circumstances under which Congress' silence is intended to per-
mit state courts to avoid hearing federal cases. 
I. THE POWER OF STATE COURTS TO HEAR 
FEDERAL CAUSES OF ACTION 
When Congress establishes a new cause of action, it has the 
choice of vesting jurisdiction exclusively in the federal courts or con-
ferring jurisdiction concurrently on state and federal courts. 7 Where 
Congress has expressly indicated in the statute whether jurisdiction 
is to be exclusive or concurrent, there is, of course, no difficulty. 
The issue becomes considerably more complex, however, where-
as is all too often the case-Congress is silent on the question of 
whether state courts have the power to hear cases based on the par-
ticular cause of action. 
A. The Claflin Principle Reconsidered 
The traditional test for determining where jurisdiction lies when 
Congress· is silent was first articulated by the Supreme Court in its 
seminal decision in Claflin v. Houseman: 8 "[1]he state court has 
jurisdiction where it is not excluded by express provision, or by in-
compatability in its exercise arising from the nature of the particular 
case."0 Though by name the Claflin decision may not be familiar 
to every first-year law student, the principle derived from it has be-
come an integral element of the jurisprudence of federalism. Thus, 
the modem-day Supreme Court concluded that "concurrent jurisdic-
tion has been a common phenomenon in our judicial history"10 and 
that the approach delineated in Claflin "has remained unmodified _ 
through the years."11 This approach dictates that, where Congress 
1. See Note, Exclusive Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts in Private Civil Actions, 
70 HARV. L. REV. 509 (1957) [hereinafter cited as Exclusive Jurisdiction]. There is 
no doubt that Congress has the power to limit jurisdiction to federal courts. See, e.g., 
The Moses Taylor, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 411, 429 (1866); Houston v. Moore, 5 U.S. (1 
Wheat.) 1, 25-26 (182Q). See also HART & WECHSLER, supra note 3, at 418-19; 1 
MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE ,r 0.63, at 230 (2d ed. 1974). 
8. 93 U.S. 130 (1876). 
9. 93 U.S. at 136. At another point in its opinion, the Claflin Court described 
the test in this manner: 
[T]he general principle is that, where jurisdiction may be conferred on the 
United States courts, it may be made exclusive where not so by the Constitution 
itself; but, if exclusive jurisdiction be neither express nor implied, the state courts 
have concurrent jurisdiction whenever, by their own constitution, they are com-
petent to take it. 
93 U.S. at 136 (emphasis added). 
10. Charles Dowd Box Co. v. Courtney, 368 U.S. 502, 507-08 (1962) (footnote 
omitted). 
11. 368 U.S. at 508. 
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is silent on the question whether state courts have the power to hear 
claims arising under a federal statute, a state court presumptively has 
such power unless, for some reason, jurisdiction is found to be im-
pliedly exclusive in the federal courts.12 
The Claflin principle had its origins in the discussions surround-
ing the framing of the Constitution, where Alexander Hamilton 
made clear his view that jurisdiction over federal causes of action 
was generally to be concurrent.13 The framers specifically chose to 
give Congress the option whether to create lower federal courts.14 
Hence it must have been clearly understood at the time that state 
courts would be competent to hear federal causes of action, since 
there was a possibility that no extensive federal judiciary would be 
formed. Because state courts are bound by the terms of the suprem-
acy clause15 to apply federal law, it seems reasonable to infer that 
the framers contemplated that concurrent state jurisdiction over fed-
eral causes of action would be the rule, rather than the exception. 
The mere fact that the framers conceived of a particular situation 
does not necessarily mean, however, that their assumptions are 
equally advisable today. Our concepts of federalism have been 
drastically altered since the time of the constitutional convention.16 
Since the first effective establishment in 1875 of general federal 
question jurisdiction in the lower federal courts, those courts have 
developed a broad expertise in dealing with problems and applica-
tions of federal law. At the same time, state judges have become 
less exposed to the intricacies of federal substantive Iaw.17 Addi-
12. See C. WRIGHT, supra note 3, at 26: "[F]ederal jurisdiction is not exclusive 
unless Congress chooses to make it so, either expressly or by fair implication." 
(footnote omitted). 
13. See THE FEDERALIST No. 82 (A. Hamilton): 
I mean not Iherefore to contend that the United States, in the course of legisla-
tion upon the objects intrusted to their direction, may not commit the decision 
of causes arising upon a particular regulation, to the federal courts solely, if such 
a measure should be deemed expedient; but I hold that the state courts will be 
divested of no part of their primitive jurisdiction, further than may relate to an 
appeal; and I am even of opinion, that in evecy case in which they were not 
expressly excluded by the future acts of the national legislature they will, of 
course take cognizance of the causes to which those acts may give birth. • • • 
When . . . we consider the state governments and the national governments, as 
they truly are, iii the light of kindred systems, and as parts of ONE WHOLE, 
the inference seems to be conclusive, that the state courts would have a concur-
rent jurisdiction in all cases arising under the laws of the union, where it was 
not expressly prohibited. 
14. See U.S. CoNST. art. III, § 1: "The judicial power of the United States, shall 
be vested in one supreme court, and in such inferior courts as the Congress may from 
time to time ordain and establish." See also C. WR!GIIT, supra note 3, at 2. 
15. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. 
16. See Redish & Woods, supra note 3, at 97-100. 
17. See, e.g., AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, SnmY OF nm DIVISION OF JURISDICTION 
BETWEEN STATE AND FEDERAL CouRTs 166-67 (1969) [hereinafter cited as ALI 
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tionally, through the usually rigorous selection process, we can be 
generally assured of some level of competence on the federal bench. 
No such assurance can be given for the state judiciary. When one 
considers also the general need for some degree of uniformity in the 
application of federal law, the modem vitality of Claflin's general 
presumption in favor of· concurrent jurisdiction may be subject to 
considerable question. 
In light of the needs of the federal system, therefore, it might 
be argued that the traditional presumption should be reversed. In 
other words, unless Congress has explicitly concluded that jurisdic-
tion over a new federal cause of action is to be concurrent, we would 
generally not presume that Congress meant to entrust to state courts 
the responsibility for fashioning federal law. Though such an argu-
ment might have force with regard to certain "uniquely" federal 
causes of action, many of the statutes Congress enacts cannot be 
categorized in this manner. In the words of Felix Frankfurter: 
We may take it for granted, however, that our distinctively federal 
law will in the main be enforced through federal courts. Federal 
"specialties" are extending their domain and require a common sys-
tem of federal tribunals. National sentiment also regards federal 
tribunals as the appropriate guardians of federal rights. But it is a 
practical sentiment. There are limits to the effective enforcement of 
national law. Wise distribution of judicial power also depends upon 
the nature of the issues. Some federal rights are readily adapted to 
enforcement by state tribunals; others are clearly meant for the fed-
eral courts.18 
For example, federal statutes may deal with matters traditionally ad-
judicated by state courts, such as negligence19 or contract;20 to force 
all cases arising under these acts into the federal courts may unneces-
sarily add to their already heavy burden. 21 
STUDY]; Mishkin, The Federal "Question" in the District Courts, 53 CoLUM. L. REV. 
157, 158-60 (1953 ). 
18. Frankfurter, Distribution of Judicial Power Between United States and State 
Courts, 13 CORNELL L.Q. 499, 515 (1928). 
19. See, e.g., Federal Employers Liability Act (FELA), 45 U.S.C. §§ 51-60 
(1970). Even though state courts are familiar with negligence cases, it appears that 
state courts have had more difficulty than federal courts in the interpretation and 
application of the FELA standards of liability. See text at note 82 infra. However, 
in order to avoid overburdening the federal courts with such suits, concurrent 
jurisdiction may be necessary. See note 82 infra. 
20. See, e.g., Labor Management Relations Act § 30l(a), 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) 
(1970). However, since the law to be applied under section 30l(a) has been held to 
be federal common law rather than state contract law, there is serious question as to 
whether jurisdiction should have been held concurrent. See notes 93-96 infra and 
accompanying text. 
21. See note 6 supra. 
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That the general Claflin presumption should not be reversed, 
however, does not suggest that the Claflin rule is free from difficulty. 
In fact, its seemingly clear directive to the courts provides the judici-
ary with no guidance in supplementing congressional intent when 
Congress has failed to state explicitly whether jurisdiction for a par-
ticular cause of action is to be concurrent or exclusively federal. 
One consequence of this shortcoming is that lower courts have, over 
the years, frequently misunderstood or even disregarded the rule. 22 
The Claflin standard, it should be recalled, does not simply 
create from congressional silence a presumption in all cases that ju-
risdiction is to be concurrent. If this is all the test did, it would at 
least have the advantage ( albeit a questionable one) 23 of predicta-
bility. However, the Court's language in Claflin was qualified by 
the limitation that in certain cases federal jurisdiction may be im-
pliedly exclusive. Yet it is not at all clear from the Claflin test under 
what circumstances a court should depart from the normal presump-
tion of concurrent jurisdiction in the event of congressional silence 
and conclude that jurisdiction for a cause of action is "impliedly ex-
clusive." 
The experience with the Sherman and Clayton antitrust acts is 
illustrative of the Claflin rule's lack of guidance. The jurisdictional 
grants in the two antitrust laws were silent on the question whether 
state courts would have concurrent jurisdiction over cases arising 
under these statutes.24 When passed, the Sherman Act provided 
that certain private civil actions "may" be brought in federal district 
court. 25 The courts have uniformly and summarily concluded that 
such actions may be brought only in federal court. 26 Although these 
courts have not considered the question at length, their rationale ap-
pears to be that the antitrust laws are uniquely federal in that they 
22. See text at notes 40-58 infra. 
23. See text at notes 61-64 infra. 
24. For the jurisdictional grant with respect to private causes of action under the 
Sherman Act, see Act of July 2, 1890, ch. 647, § 7, 26 Stat. 209, 210. For the 
Clayton Act jurisdictional grant, see Act of Oct. 15, 1914, ch. 323, §§ 4, 16, 38 Stat. 
730, 731, 737. The present jurisdictional grant covering private actions under both 
the Sherman and Clayton Acts provides: "Any person who shall be injured in his 
business or property by reason of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws may sue 
therefor in any district court of the United States ..•. " 15 U,S.C. § 15 (1970) 
(emphasis added). 
25. See note 24 supra. 
26. See, e.g., Klein v. American Luggage Works, Inc., 206 F. Supp. 924, revd. 011 
other grou11d, 323 F.2d 787 (D. Del. 1962); Otis Elevator Co. v. Reynolds, 81 Misc. 
2d 314, 366 N.Y.S.2d 256 (Sup. Ct. 1975); American Broadcasting-Paramount 
Theatres, Inc. v. Hazel Bishop, Inc., 31 Misc. 2d 1056, 223 N.Y.S.2d 178 (Sup. Ct. 
1961); Ackert v. Ausman, 29 Misc. 2d 962,218 N.Y.S.2d 814 (Sup. Ct. 1961). 
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pertain to issues of national commerce. 27 Thus the courts have, in 
essence, found the jurisdictional grant of the Sherman Act to be im-
pliedly exclusive in the federal courts. However, the legislative his-
tory indicates that a judicial finding of implied exclusivity was very 
possibly contrary to the actual intent of Congress.28 In debating a 
proposed amendment that would have made jurisdiction expressly 
concurrent, one senator said: 
This section [as it stands without the amendment] provides that any 
person who shall be injured, etc., by anything declared unlawful in 
the act may sue therefore in the circuit court of the United States. 
. . . It leaves everybody, ·as everybody now has the power under 
any law of the United States, to sue anybody who wrongs him . . . 
in a State court if he chooses to do so. So I . . . make the sugges-
tion to him that his amendment [which would provide an express 
grant of concurrent jurisdiction] is quite useless and unnecessary.29 
The concern of many of those opposing the amendment appears not 
to have been that they desired jurisdiction to be vested exclusively 
in the federal courts, but rather that the effect of the amendment 
would be to impose a duty on state courts to hear cases arising under 
the Sherman Act. The amendment's opponents thought that Con-
gress did not have the power to impose a duty on state courts to 
take cognizance of federal causes of action providing for the award 
of a penalty.30 
This history suggests that Congress may have correctly under-
stood the principal Claflin presumption that its silence meant state 
courts would have the power to hear private causes of action under 
the Sherman Act. But the courts, in departing from that presump-
tion and finding jurisdiction exclusive, may have displaced actual 
congressional intent, an error that was at least partially attributable 
to the failure of the Supreme Court to enunciate standards for the 
determination of implied exclusivity. 
27. See, e.g., Locker v. American Tobacco Co., 121 App. Div. 443, 106 N.Y.S. 
115, 119 (1907): 
We may eliminate from consideration the statutes of the United States [Sherman 
Act § 1] . . . because they have no bearing upon the cause of action here pre-
sented. They relate only to matters in restraint of trade or commerce between 
or among the several states of the Union or with foreign nations, and for a vio-
lation of their provisions redress must be sought in the federal courts, which 
alone have jurisdiction. (emphasis added). 
28. See Exclusive Jurisdiction, supra note 7, at 509, 510 n.13. 
29. See S. Doc. No. 147, 57th Cong., 2d Sess. 316 (1903). 
30. Id. at 306-21. See Exclusive Jurisdiction, supra note 7, at 510 n.13. Con-
gress' view with respect to its constitutional power to impose an obligation on state 
courts to enforce federal causes of action deemed "penal" by the states has been 
resolved to the contrary by the Supreme Court in Testa v. Katt, 330 U.S. 386 (1947). 
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An examination of the Claflin standard in light of the legislative 
history of the Clayton Act raises different questions concerning the 
standard's capacity for rationally allocating jurisdiction between fed-
eral and state courts. As with the Sherman Act, the jurisdictional 
provision covering private civil actions under the Clayton Act was 
silent in regard to state court jurisdiction, 31 and the courts found 
it to be impliedly exclusive. 32 Prior to the act's passage, Congress 
had rejected an amendment that would have vested concurrent juris-
diction in the state courts.33 However, unlike the debate over the 
Sherman Act, the legislative history here reveals that the amendment 
was apparently rejected because Congress intended that jurisdiction 
be exclusive in the federal courts. 84 Thus, the result reached in the 
Clayton Act context, that the federal courts have exclusive jurisdic-
tion, seems to have coincided with actual congressional intent. Yet 
this fact, rather than providing support for the Claflin approach, also 
casts doubt on the wisdom of its continued use, for it indicates that 
in enacting the Clayton Act Congress was laboring under the mis-
apprehension that its failure to make jurisdiction explicitly concur-
rent rendered jurisdiction exclusively federal. Such a misunder-
standing between Congress and the judiciary is, to say the least, 
troubling. 35 In any event, the formulation of a rule providing for 
a presumption of concurrent jurisdiction, with an implied exclusivity 
exception, has meaning only if the courts give a reasoned justification 
for invoking or failing to invoke the exception; such justifications 
were totally absent from the antitrust decisions, as well as from 
Claflin itself.36 
31. See note 24 supra. 
32. See, e.g., Freeman v. Bee Mach. Co., 319 U.S. 448 (1948); General Inv. Co. 
v. Lake Shore & Michigan S. Ry., 260 U.S. 245 (1922); Leonia Amusement Corp. v. 
Loew's Inc., 117 F. Supp. 747 (S.D.N.Y. 1953). 
33. 51 Cong. Rec. 9664 (1914). 
34. See id. at 9662-64. Thus, it appears that the debate over, and defeat of, the 
proposed grant of concurrent jurisdiction to the states focused not on the power of 
Congress to impose a duty on state courts to hear claims arising under the Act but 
rather on whether state courts would have the power to hear federal claims. Defeat 
of the amendment, therefore, seems to have reflected the actual intent of Congress to 
vest exclusive jurisdiction in the federal courts. 
35. See text following note 58 infra. 
36. See also United States v. Bank of New York & Trust Co., 296 U.S. 463 
(1936). This case involved what is now 28 U.S.C. § 1345 (1970), which provides 
that the federal district courts have jurisdiction where the United States is a plaintiff, 
but which is silent as to state court jurisdiction. In finding that jurisdiction was 
concurrent, the Supreme Court made no mention of the implied exclusivity branch of 
the Claflin rule. In other words, the Court made no attempt to discover whether 
jurisdiction should be found impliedly exclusive but simply concluded that jurisdiction 
was concurrent. 
December 1976] Federal Causes of Action 319 
Some additional illustrations will underscore the judicial con-
fusion surrounding the interpretation to be given congressional si-
lence. The first example involves cases arising under the Outer 
Continental Shelf Lands Act.37 The grant of jurisdiction in the Act 
provides that the "United States district courts shall have original ju-
risdiction of cases and controversies arising out of or in connection 
with any operations conducted on the outer Continental Shelf. "38 
Under the traditional Claflin rule, the primary presumption would 
be that Congress intended state courts to have concurrent jurisdiction 
over such causes of action .. The judiciary, however, has indicated 
that jurisdiction lies exclusively in the federal courts. 39 In Gravois 
v. Travelers Indemnity Co.,4° the court held: "Had Congress in-
tended to grant concurrent jurisdiction to the State Courts it would 
have so specified in this Act as they did in the Jones Act. The fail-
ure to do so shows their intention to retain jurisdiction in the United 
States Courts."41 This language suggests that the court did not 
merely find this act to be an appropriate instance of implied exclu-
sivity but actually reversed the principal Claflin presumption, so that 
congressional silence would be taken to represent an intent to make 
jurisdiction exclusive. 42 The courts can hardly expect Congress to 
understand the implications of the judge-made Claflin rule if they 
themselves are unaware of its meaning. 43 
37. 43 u.s.c. §§ 1331-1343 (1970). 
38. 43 U.S.C. § 1333(b) (1970). 
39. See, e.g., Gravois v. Travelers Indem. Co., 173 So. 2d 550 (La. Ct. App. 
1965). Cf. Huson v. Otis Engr. Corp., 430 F.2d 27, 30 (5th Cir. 1970). 
40. 173 So. 2d 550 (La. Ct. App. 1965). 
41. 173 So. 2d at 556. 
42. As noted earlier, a complete reversal of the Claflin presumption is probably 
not advisable. See text at notes 18-21 supra. 
43. Though the Gravois opinion at the outset does evince an apparent disregard 
for the Claflin presumption, that decision, as well as others, also appears to apply 
more pragmatic criteria in concluding that jurisdiction under the statute in question is 
impliedly exclusive. Thus, the courts have emphasized the pervasive federal regula-
tion reflected in the substantive provisions of the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act. 
See Fluor Ocean Servs., Inc. v. Rucker Co., 341 F. Supp. 757, 759-60 (E.D. La. 
1972); Gravois v. Travelers Indem. Co., 173 So. 2d 550, 556 (La. Ct. App. 1965). As 
the Fluor Ocean court noted: "In an area where the federal government has exerted 
exclusive sovereignty, such as the outer Continental Shelf, a single federal forum 
would be more appropriate than multiple state forums to decide disputes that arise 
there." 341 F. Supp. at 760. Moreover, it appears that the legislative history of the 
Act would support a finding of exclusivity. See Rodrigue v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 
395 U.S. 352, 365 (1969). As will be suggested below, see text at notes 72-118 infra, 
a movement toward such a pragmatic approach is likely to result in an allocation of 
jurisdiction over federal cases that is more rational than that generated by the 
traditionally articulated rule. 
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The problems surrounding use of the traditional rule are also re-
flected in the Ninth Circuit's decision in Tsang v. Kan.44 The issue 
in Tsang was whether a prior state court adjudication of a veteran's 
claim under a federal statute45 relating to employment and wages 
should be given res judicata effect; to decide this issue, the court 
had to determine first whether the state court had jurisdiction to en-
tertain the case. The federal statute conferred jurisdiction on the 
federal courts to hear these veterans' claims but was silent as to state 
court jurisdiction. The court noted that the Claflin rule was the 
governing principle. Acknowledging that the normal presumption 
was that state courts had jurisdiction, the court asked whether juris-
diction was impliedly exclusive, and answered in the negative. But 
in doing so, the court appeared to misunderstand certain aspects of 
the traditional Claflin presumption. Instead of considering possible 
factors that might lead to the conclusion that concurrent jurisdiction 
would somehow be incompatible with accomplishment of the stat-
ute's purposes, the court deemed it necessary to find additional fac-
tors that called for concurrent jurisdiction. It pointed out, for ex-
ample, that it would be inconvenient for veterans to be forced to 
bring their claims in federal court, while access to state courts might 
be easier.46 But under the traditional rule derived from Claflin, so 
long as Congress has been silent on the question of concurrent juris-
diction, the burden is on those arguing exclusive jurisdiction to es-
tablish that concurrent jurisdiction would be inappropriate. Unless 
such factors are present (and the court in Tsang found none), there 
is no need for the court to seek additional policy reasons calling for 
concurrent jurisdiction. 
The confusion in this area can also be discerned in the judicial 
treatment of the jurisdictional provision in the Interstate Commerce 
Act relating to enjoining orders of the Interstate Commerce Com-
m1ss1on. The jurisdictional grant provides: "Except as otherwise 
provided by Act of Congress, the district courts shall have juris-
diction of any civil action to enforce, enjoin, set aside, annul or sus-
pend, in whole or in any part, any order of the Interstate Commerce 
Commission."47 The courts have simply concluded that this is a 
44. 173 F.2d 204 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 337 U.S. 939 (1949). 
45. Selective Service and Training Act of 1940, 50 U.S.C. § 308(b)(B) (1970). 
46. 173 F.2d at 205. The court may simply have been adding "icing to the cake," 
rather than feeling the need for affirmative reasons for concurrent jurisdiction. The 
court's decision is ambiguous on the point, however, and it is therefore important to 
emphasize that, under the traditional approach, in the face of congressional silence 
there is no need for the finding of such additional factors, 
47. 28 U.S.C. § 1336(a) (1970). 
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grant of exclusive jurisdiction to the federal courts. 48 While this may 
seem correct as a policy matter, it should be recalled that the normal 
presumption under the Claflin rule is that the state courts would have 
concurrent jurisdiction. In order for the two-part test to make any 
sense, the courts must give adequate reasons for invoking the part 
of the Claflin rule providing for exceptions. Yet it appears that the 
only reason proffered by the courts for a finding of exclusivity in 
this area rests on the fact that the United States is an indispensable 
party to a suit to enjoin an ICC order; because it has not consented 
to suit in the state courts, the latter have no jurisdiction to entertain 
such an action.40 But Congress should be presumed to have con-
sented to suit in a state court, for, if it had understood the Claflin 
presumption, it would have understood the consequences of its fail-
ure to make jurisdiction exclusive. 50 
A final example of the judicial confusion surrounding the Claflin 
rule is presented by the references to the jurisdictional grant in the 
National Bank Act51 in two Supreme Court cases, First National 
Bank v. Union Trust Company52 and Mercantile National Bank v. 
Langdeau. 53 In Union Trust, the Court was faced with the issue 
of jurisdiction over cases arising under the Federal Reserve Bank 
Act, but it discussed the National Bank Act in passing. The Court 
concluded that "without the grant of the act of Congress [ of explicit 
concurrent jurisdiction] such controversies would have been federal 
in character."54 Nearly half a century later, the Langdeau Court 
repeated this conclusion: 
48. See, e.g., Seaboard Air Line R.R. v. Daniel, 333 U.S. 118 (1948) (dictum); 
Davidson Transfer & Storage Co. v. United States, 164 F. Supp. 571 (D. Md. 1958). 
49. See Seaboard Air Line R.R. v. Daniel, 333 U.S. ll8, 122 (1948); Lambert 
Run Coal Co. v. Baltimore & O.R.R., 258 U.S. 377, 382 (1922). 
50. A similar situation can be found in 26 U.S.C. § 7426 (1970), which confers 
jurisdiction on the federal courts to entertain claims against the United States for a 
wrongful levy on property but fails to mention state courts. The courts have said that 
jurisdiction under this section is exclusive. See Stapleton v. $2,438,110, 454 F.2d 
1210 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 894 (1972); Crow v. Wyoming Timber Prods., 
424 F.2d 93 (10th Cir. 1970). Apparently, jurisdiction is deemed exclusive for the 
same reason as it is in the case of actions to enjoin ICC orders and therefore is 
subject to the same objection, if one assumes the Claflin rule is the governing 
principle. "Because the waiver of sovereign immunity contained in § 7426 is limited 
to suits brought in federal court, a state court would not have jurisdiction over an 
action seeking relief under that section." Crow v. Wyoming Timber Prods., 424 F.2d 
93, 96 (10th Cir. 1970). However, as is also true in the ICC context, if the Claflin 
rule is rejected and a case-by-case approach followed, a finding of exclusivity is 
probably the correct result. 
51. 12 u.s.c. § 94 (1970). 
52. 244 U.S. 416 (1917). 
53. 371 U.S. 555 (1963). 
54. 244 U.S. at 428. 
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Section 59 of the 1863 Act provided that suits by and against any 
association under the Act could be had in any federal court held 
within the district in which the association was established. No men-
tion was made of suits in state courts. If the·law had remained in 
this form, there might well have been grave doubt about the suability 
of national banks in the state courts, as this court noted in First 
National Bank v. Union Trust Co .... 55 
One might ask what happened to the Claflin rule. In Union Trust, 
it was simply not mentioned. In Langdeau, the Court, after citing 
Union Trust, indicated in a footnote "[b]ut cf. Claflin v. House-
man. "56 It is difficult to see how a court cognizant of Claflin could 
have believed that there was "grave doubt" as to concurrent juris-
diction, at least without a fair analysis under the second branch of 
the Claflin rule. 57 Even the Supreme Court, it would seem, has 
been unable to implement the Claflin rule in a rational fashion. 68 
Such confusion may represent more than a failure of the judiciary 
to develop enduring generalizable principles for finding instances of 
implied exclusivity. Beyond the judicial failure to apply consistently 
55. 371 U.S. at 559 (footnote omitted). 
56. 371 U.S. at 559 n.7. 
57. It should be noted that under an "implied exclusivity" analysis, the conclusion 
of both Courts might have been correct. However, neither seemed aware that such 
an analysis was necessary. 
58. A few other examples of the judicial uncertainty as to the effect of congres-
sional silence are worth noting, for they also cast doubt on the wisdom of retaining 
the Claflin rule as an allocator of jurisdiction between the federal and state systems. 
Section 302(e) of the Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 186(e) 
(1970), confers jurisdiction on the federal courts to hear claims, inter alia, that a 
union pension fund has violated federal statutory requirements. The jurisdictional 
grant does not mention state courts. With neither side adequately explaining its 
conclusion, the courts are split as to whether jurisdiction is exclusive. For cases 
suggesting jurisdiction is exclusive, see Insley v. Joyce, 330 F. Supp. 1228, 1234 (N.D. 
Ill. 1971); Davenport v. Terry, 134 N.J. Super. 88, 338 A.2d 815 (Super. Ct. 
App. Div. 1975). For cases concluding jurisdiction is concurrent, see Nixon v. 
O'Callaghan, 392 F. Supp. 1081 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); Cox v. Superior Ct., 52 Cal. 2d 
855, 346 P.2d 15 (1959). 
Section 4(a) of the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, 42 U.S.C. § 
2000e-5(f) (Supp. V 1975), also gives the federal courts jurisdiction over suits for 
unlawful employment practices but fails to mention state courts. In Hutchings v. 
United States Indus., Inc., 428 F.2d 303, 310 (5th Cir. 1970), the court suggested 
only federal courts could hear such claims. But see Anderson v. Tennessee Office of 
Economic Opportunity, 384 F. Supp. 788, 792 (M.D. Tenn. 1974) (suggesting that 
such suits can be brought in state courts). 
Finally, the jurisdictional grant in section 3(c) of the Uniform Time Act of 1966, 
15 U.S.C. § 260a(c) (1970), confers jurisdiction on the federal courts to entertain 
actions for violations of the section and makes no mention of state courts. The court 
in Whitmer v. House, 198 Kan. 629, 634, 426 P.2d 100, 106 (1967) said: "In view of 
the specific designation of Federal District Courts, as the proper forum for the 
enforcement of the Act and the express declaration of the governing procedure in 
such proceedings, it appears that the state courts are excluded from any jurisdiction 
.... " The court's statement constitutes, in effect, a reversal of the traditional 
Claflin presumption. 
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the rule derived from Claflin lies a more fundamental problem. The 
effectiveness of the first portion of the Claflin approach depends on 
total comprehension by Congres~ of its meaning: Congress must be 
aware that its silence as to state court jurisdiction over a federal cause 
of action will generally be taken by the courts to mean that jurisdic-
tion is concurrent, lest state courts be given jurisdiction over the de-
velopment of federal rights that Congress did not deem appropriate 
for state adjudication. 
The second portion of the Claflin rule, on the other hand, as-
sumes there exist federal causes of action which, although not ex-
pressly made exclusive by Congress, are so "federal" in nature that 
exclusive federal jurisdiction can be inferred. But if Congress genu-
inely understood the effects of the first portion of the Claflin rule, 
is it conceivable that Congress would have considered a statutory 
cause of action so uniquely federal that jurisdiction should lie exclu-
sively in the federal courts, yet not explicitly so provide in the stat-
ute? By leaving the statute silent on the question of concurrent ju-
risdiction, Congress would be relying on the courts to overcome the 
first portion of Claflin and to hold jurisdiction exclusive-an uncer-
tain outcome at best. It would certainly seem illogical for Congress 
to leave to the vagaries of judicial decision the fate of a cause of 
action that Congress believed to demand exclusive federal jurisdic-
tion. Yet that is exactly the result postulated by the second portion 
of Claflin-the doctrine of implied exclusivity-for by its terms that 
doctrine will not apply unless the cause of action appears to be 
uniquely federal in nature. What the existence of the second por-
tion of the Claflin rule seems implicitly to recognize, then, is that 
in circumstances where Congress has remained silent on the question 
of exclusive jurisdiction, but the courts have nevertheless found juris-
diction to be impliedly exclusive, Congress either (a) is unaware that 
its silence will be taken to mean that jurisdiction is to be concurrent 
or (b) has simply not given the matter any consideration. For, as 
just noted, if neither of these facts were true, the doctrine of implied 
exclusivity would impute to Congress motives of extremely question-
able rationality. Accordingly, if the two segments of the Claflin rule 
are to be retained, we are left with an impossible situation: The 
fact that we retain a doctrine of implied exclusivity effectively con-
cedes that on occasion (as, indeed, the Clayton Act's history demon-
strates)59 Congress may not comprehend the implications of the first 
portion of the rule. Yet such a concession indicates that retention 
59. See notes 31-35 supra and accompanying text. 
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of the first portion of the Claflin rule-presumption of concurrent 
jurisdiction from congressional silence-may often be unwise. 
Recognition of the inadequacy of the dual-segment Claflin rule 
leaves open several options. As noted above, we might reverse the 
presumption. In other words, congressional silence could be taken 
to mean that jurisdiction was to lie exclusively in the federal courts, 
and an explicit statutory statement would generally be required to 
render jurisdiction concurrent. But, as previously noted, many federal 
causes of action deal with legal questions similar to those already 
heard in state court; for these questions, presumably, the state courts 
possess adequate expertise. To require the federal courts to hear all 
such cases unless Congress explicitly says otherwise would unduly 
add to their already heavy burden. A second option would be to re-
ject only the portion of the Claflin rule dealing with implied ex-
clusivity. Adoption of this alternative would give rise to the predict-
able-and mechanical-rule that congressional silence in all cases 
will be taken to mean concurrent jurisdiction. It is unlikely the 
judiciary would accept such a result, however, and with good reason. 
As Professors Bickel and Wellington have commented, "there are 
solutions the legislature may adopt for problems properly in its sphere 
which on analysis tum out to be enmeshed in other issues and to be 
fraught with consequences above and beyond those that Congress had 
in view."00 As the courts have apparently concluded in the antitrust 
area, 61 there may be federal causes of action, wholly inappropriate 
for state adjudication and development, for which Congress has, 
somehow, failed to make federal jurisdiction explicitly exclusive. 
The Claflin Court itself recognized that some safety valve must be 
available to the courts in deciding the question of exclusive jurisdic-
tion. When one also considers that at times62 Congress has appar-
60. Bickel & Wellington, Legislative Purpose and the Judicial Process: The 
Lincoln Mills Case, 71 HAR.v. L. REV. 1, 27 (1957). 
61. See notes 26, 32 supra. 
62. It should be noted that Congress has sometimes evidenced a conscious 
understanding of the first branch of the Claflin presumption. When the Federal 
Employers Liability Act was passed in 1908, Act of April 22, 1908, ch. 149, 3.5 Stat. 
65 (current version at 45 U.S.C. §§ 51-60 (1970)), there was no mention of state 
court jurisdiction. Subsequently, in Hoxie v. New York, N.H. & H.R.R., 82 Conn. 
352, 73 A. 754 (1909), a Connecticut court declined to hear a case arising under the 
Act because it concluded jurisdiction was intended to be exclusive. In 1910, Congress 
amended section 6 of the Act to provide expressly for concurrent state court jurisdic-
tion. See Act of April 5, 1910, ch. 143, 36 Stat. 291. The legislative history 
accompanying this amendment suggests that Congress understood when it originally 
passed the Act that its silence meant jurisdiction would be concurrent. See S. REP. 
No. 467, 61st Cong., 2d Sess. 411 (1910). However, all this establishes is that 
Congress' understanding of the Claf li11 rule is as unpredictable and haphazard as its 
misunderstanding of it. 
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ently misunderstood the effect of its silence, adoption of this second 
alternative becomes highly questionable. 
The third option is a rejection of the first portion of the Claflin 
test. This rejection of the Claflin presumption must be distinguished 
from the first alternative considered, namely its reversal. Under this 
"rejection" approach, no presumption whatsoever would be inferred 
from congressional failure to deal with the issue of concurrent-juris-
diction for a particular cause of action. The courts would read noth-
ing into congressional silence; instead, they would examine each case 
to determine whether the needs of the federal system or the legis-
lative history indicate a need for exclusivity. In this way, a claim 
of implied exclusive jurisdiction would not be faced with the signifi-
cant hurdle currently presented by the first branch of the Claflin 
rule.63 
The third alternative appears to be the most reasonable, if only 
by default. However, one must still develop rational criteria upon 
which a determination of exclusivity can be made. The next section 
explores the various factors that might suitably constitute those cri-
teria. 
B. Alternatives to the Claflin 4,.pproach: A Search for 
Rational Criteria 
1. The Modified Dowd Approach: A Look to Legislative History 
A possible modification of the traditional Claflin approach-one 
superior to the rationale used in the development of implied exclu-
sivity in the antitrust area-is the method employed by the Supreme 
Court in Charles Dowd Box Co. v. Courtney.64 There the Court 
considered whether state courts have concurrent jurisdiction under 
63. It might be contended that, as a practical matter, rejection of the Claflin rule 
would have little effect on the judicial approach to exclusive jurisdiction, since under 
both Claflin and the case-by-case approach suggested here, see text at notes 72-100 
infra, the courts will be looking to many of the same factors in making a finding of 
exclusivity. Even if this were true, rejection of the Claflin rule seems warranted, if 
only because of its inherent logical difficulties. But even from a purely practical 
standpoint, it is likely that replacement of the Claflin presumption with a case-by-
case, nonpresumptive analysis would lead to a rejection of what the Supreme Court 
has called our nation's "consistent history of hospitable acceptance of concurrent ju-
risdiction." Charles Dowd Box Co. v. Courtney, 368 U.S. 502, 508 (1962). Under 
Claflin, the presumption is that jurisdiction is concurrent, and some strong showing of 
need for exclusive jurisdiction is required to overcome that presumption. Under the 
revised analysis suggested here, in each case the court would fully consider the 
justifications claimed to warrant concurrent, as well as exclusive, jurisdiction. See 
text at note 97 infra. It is therefore likely that the analysis suggested here would give 
rise to a more balanced appraisal of the advisability of exclusive federal jurisdiction. 
64. 368 U.S. 502 (1%2). 
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section 30l(a) of the Labor Management Relations Act, 05 which 
was silent on the question. In holding that jurisdiction was concur-
rent, the Court placed some reliance on the fact that the language 
of the jurisdictional grant did not expressly vest exclusive jurisdiction 
in the federal courts: "It provides that suits of the kind described 
'may' be brought in the federal district courts, not that they must 
be."06 The Court then invoked the Claflin rule for determining 
where jurisdiction lies when Congress is silent. After noting that 
in such cases jurisdiction is generally concurrent, the Court pro-
ceeded with a particularized examination of the legislative history 
of section 301(a), in order to determine whether this was an appro-
priate case for a finding of implied exclusivity. From this examina-
tion, the Court concluded: 
The legislative history makes clear that the basic purpose of § 301 (a) 
was not to limit, but to expand, the availability of forums for the en-
forcement of contracts made by labor organizations. Moreover, there 
is explicit evidence that Congress expressly intended not to encroach 
upon the existing jurisdiction of the state courts. 07 
The Dowd Court eliminates some of the conceptual difficulties 
of the Claflin rule by providing specific guidelines for applying the 
implied exclusivity exception. Under Dowd, a court would presume 
that state courts generally have jurisdiction when Congress is silent 
on the question, but it would inquire into the legislative history of 
a particular act to determine whether Congress actually intended ju-
risdiction to be exclusive. 
The Dowd approach can be modified to fit into our third op-
tion-rejection of the primary Claflin presumption. Under this 
65. 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (1970). Section 301 (a) provides: 
Suits for violations of contracts between an employer and a labor organization 
representing employees in an industry affecting commerce as defined in this 
chapter, or between any such labor organization, may be brought in any district 
court of the United States having jurisdiction of the parties, without respect to 
the amount in controversy or without regard to the citizenship of the parties. 
66. 368 U.S. at 506. However, the permissive language in the jurisdictional 
grant, if it has any significance, only speaks to the question of whether there was an 
express grant of exclusive jurisdiction to the federal courts. Once this question is 
answered in the negative, the problem is one of ascertaining the meaning of 
congressional silence. On this question, the use of the word "may" in the jurisdic-
tional grant appears irrelevant. For, although jurisdiction was found concurrent 
under section 301(a) of the Labor Management Relations Act, jurisdiction was found 
impliedly exclusive in the antitrust laws, which contain the same permissive language. 
See notes 26, 32 supra. 
67. 368 U.S. at 508-09. For example, one senator said: 
Mr. President, there is nothing whatever in the now-being-considered amendment 
which takes away from the State courts all the present rights of the State courts 
to adjudicate the rights between parties in relation to labor agreements. The 
amendment merely says that the Federal courts shall have jurisdiction. It does 
not attempt to take away the jurisdiction of the State courts. 
368 U.S. at 512. 
December 1976] Federal Causes of Action 327 
modification, a court would simply examine the legislative history to 
determine congressional intent on the issue of concurrent jurisdic-
tion. Such a standard would eliminate the possibility, inherent in 
the periodic, unsupported invocation of the second branch of the 
Claflin standard, that jurisdiction would be held exclusive when 
Congress in fact intended that state courts have the power to hear 
claims arising under a federal statute. 68 Thus, if strictly adhered to, 
Dowd at least provides a systematic approach to the judicial distri-
bution of jurisdiction between the state and federal systems where 
Congress has remained silent in the jurisdictional grant. The mod-
ified Dowd approach would retain these benefits, while at the same 
time avoiding the logical and practical difficulties presented by a 
two-pronged Claflin test. 
The viability of the modified Dowd approach is questionable, 
however. If the desired goal is a reasoned and deliberate allocation 
of jurisdiction over federal statutory claims between federal and state 
courts, exclusive reliance on legislative history seems inadequate. 
The legislative history, like the statute itself, may simply be silent 
on the question of state court jurisdiction. To allocate jurisdiction 
on the basis of such an inquiry may often relegate an important ques-
tion 00 to sheer speculation. 
68. This appears to have occurred with jurisdiction over private civil actions under 
the Sherman Act. See text at note 28 supra. 
69. One possibly significant result of a finding of concurrent or exclusive jurisdic-
tion would be the potential collateral estoppel effect of issues litigated in state court 
on a subsequent federal court proceeding. In Blonder-Tongue Laboratories, Inc. v. 
University of Illinois Foundation, 402 U.S. 313 (1971), the Supreme Court held that 
an alleged infringer in a patent infringement suit in federal court could use a prior 
federal court determination of a patent's invalidity in an earlier infringement suit as 
collateral estoppel against the purported patent holder who was a party to the 
preceding suit. Earlier, in Lear v. Adkins, 39-5 U.S. 653 (1960), the Court held that 
a state court could determine the validity of a patent when its invalidity was raised as 
a defense to a breach of contract suit. One commentator has assumed that, after 
Lear and Blonder-Tongue, state court findings as to the validity of a patent may be 
used as collateral estoppel against the purported patent holder in a subsequent patent 
infringement suit in federal court. See Chisum, The Allocation of Jurisdiction 
Between State and Federal Courts in Patent Litigation, 46 WASH. L. REV. 633, 662-64 
(1971). 
However, it is not clear that the holding in Blonder would extend to the situation 
where the previous finding of patent invalidity was made by a state court. See HART 
& WECHSLER, supra note 3, at 878 n.l. A substantial argument can be made that to 
give collateral estoppel effect to such state court findings would bring about too 
extensive an infringement on the federal court's exclusive jurisdiction. See Exclusive 
Jurisdiction, supra note 7, at 514-15. Cf. Lyons v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 222 
F.2d 184, 189 (2d Cir. 1955). If, in fact, the collateral estoppel effect of state court 
findings on subsequent federal proceedings will tum upon whether the matter is 
within the exclusive jurisdiction of the federal courts, then any rule adopted by the 
courts to allocate jurisdiction between federal and state courts when Congress is silent 
takes on increasing significance. 
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However, even where an examination of the legislative history 
reveals some discussion of the jurisdictional issue, total reliance by 
the courts on their discernment of the actual intent of Congress will 
not produce a sensible allocation of jurisdiction for federal causes 
of action. First of all, if the legislative history is extensive, the goal 
of ascertaining the actual intent of a majority of Congress may be 
unattainable. In the words of one commentator, 
[t]he various documented steps in the progress of a statute [should] 
be realistically seen, not as so many conscious group decisions in 
which a majority of legislators have participated, but rather as forms 
of "public notice" of their progressing activities by those who do par-
ticipate. 70 
Moreover, even if purported expressions of majority opinion could 
be identified, their reliability would be questionable, for "[m]ate-
rials in hearings and floor debates" are extremely "heterogeneous 
and fragmentary" and are heavily "influenced by the tactics of pro-
moting enactment."71 This is not to suggest, of course, that legis-
lative history can never be of assistance in deciphering congressional 
intent. Rather, the point is that, because of its inherent limitations, 
exclusive reliance on legislative history is inadvisable. Since both 
the attainability and reliability of expressions of congressional intent 
are subject to serious question, both the Dowd approach and the 
modified Dowd approach are inadequate in view of the conse-
quences of these determinations of concurrent and exclusive jurisdic-
tion. 
70. Linde, Book Review, 66 YALE L.J. 973, 975 (1957), quoted in Washy, 
Legislative Materials as an Aid to Statutory Interpretation: A Caveat, 12 J. Pun. 
LAW 262, 270 (1963). 
71. R. DICKERSON, THE INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION OF STATUTES 155 
(1975). Dickerson, in fact, goes so far as to state that these materials "have almost 
no credibility for the purposes of later interpretation." Id. See also Justice Jackson's 
concurrence in Schwegmann Bros. v. Calvert Distillers Co., 341 U.S. 384, 395-96 
(1951): 
Resort to legislative history is only justified where the face of the Act is ines-
capably ambiguous, and then I think we should not go beyond Committee re-
ports, which presumably are well considered and carefully prepared. I cannot 
deny that I have sometimes offended against that rule. But to select casual 
statements from floor debates, not always distinguished for candor or accuracy, 
as a basis for making up our minds what law Congress intended to enact is to 
substitute ourselves for the Congress in one of its important functions. 
Even the reliability of "presumably . . . well considered and carefully prepared" 
Committee Reports is subject to serious question: 
[C]ommittees are not always representative of the general membership; they are 
not each a random sample of the larger body, nor are they fractional committees 
of the whole . . . . 
The less representative the committee, the greater the possibility that the 
ideas of the committee will vary from those of the other members of the legis-
lature in a given issue. 
Washy, supra note 70, at 271. 
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2. An Exercise in Creative Judicial Lawmaking: A Look 
to the Needs of the Federal System. 
329 
An alternative means of replacing the traditional Claflin two-
pronged analysis would ,be for a court to proceed on a case-by-case 
basis (as in the modified Dowd approach), looking not to legislative 
history but to the practical needs of the federal system as perceived 
by the court. In other words, a court faced with congressional si-
lence in a statute as to state court jurisdiction would engage in crea-
tive judicial lawmaking. 72 In so doing, the judiciary would not be 
unduly invading the legislative province. In the words of Learned 
Hand: 
When we ask what Congress "intended", usually there can be no 
answer, if what we mean is what any person or group of persons 
actually had in mind. Flinch as we may, what we do, and must do, 
is to project ourselves, as best we can, into the position of those who 
uttered the words, and to impute to them how they would have dealt 
with the concrete occasion. 73 
Indeed, the Claflin rule itself attempts to supplement expressly 
stated congressional intent, albeit in a generalized and unsatisfactory 
fashion. 
In exercising its creative judicial lawmaking function when Con-
gress is silent on the question of concurrent jurisdiction, a court 
should examine the potential impingement on important federal in-
terests and programs that might result from their consideration by 
state judges who lack sufficient background, expertise or--on occa-
sion-competence to deal with these uniquely federal concerns. 
Considerations of expertise may well serve as a modern justifica-
tion for the generally accepted principle that a state court may not 
directly control the actions of a federal officer. In Tarble's Case,74 
for example, where the Supreme Court indicated that state courts 
lacked power to issue writs of habeas corpus to federal officials, it 
72. The creative judicial lawmaking terminology was derived from Professor 
Dickerson's work on statutory interpretation. See R. DICKERSON, supra note 71, at 
169. However, it should be noted that the authors do not purport to employ the 
terminology in the technical sense in which it is used in Professor Dickerson's 
conceptual framework. Instead, the authors are using the creative lawmaking term in 
a looser sense: "It has been said that the problem of statutory interpretation is to 
give meaning to that which is meaningless, and that, to do this, the court must give 
expression not to what the legislature thought but to what it would have thought had 
it thought." Foster, Public Law and Social Change in SOCIETY AND TIIE LAW: NEW 
MEANING FOR AN OLD PROFESSION 162 (1962), quoted in Wasby, supra note 70, at 
262. 
73. United States v. Klinger, 199 F.2d 645, 648 (2d Cir. 1952), affd. per curiam, 
345 U.S. 979 (1953). 
74. 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 397 (1871). 
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noted that if state courts possessed such power, "[i]n many exigen-
cies the measures of the National government might ... be entirely 
bereft of their efficiency and value."75 By having power to control 
directly the actions of federal officials, state courts that may be un-
familiar with or antagonistic to federal programs76 can interfere with 
the execution of those programs. Considerations such as these have 
caused the judiciary generally to infer exclusive federal jurisdiction 
to issue writs of habeas corpus, mandamus,77 or injunction78 to fed-
eral officials, despite the absence of an explicit statement by Con-
gress on this issue. 
Admittedly, such a form of potential state court interference with 
federal programs constitutes an unusually direct and immediate 
threat to federal governmental interests; arguably, then, the rationale 
for exclusive federal jurisdiction may be limited to situations where 
the danger of interference is this acute. However, even in a case 
where there exists no danger of direct state control of the actions 
of federal officials, there is, in the words of one commentator, a 
"probability that the federal bench [is] better equipped to cope with 
the technical problems inherent in actions under a particular stat-
ute."79 The federal judiciary has, indeed, developed a substantial 
expertise in those areas where the federal courts have been given 
exclusive jurisdiction. so 
Federal judges are appointed under uniform selection proce-
dures, and have developed "an expertness in dealing with questions 
of federal law that comes from more extended contact with such 
questions than state court judges have. "81 The experience under 
75. 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 409. See also Ableman v. Booth, 62 U.S. (21 How.) 
506 (1858). 
76. See, e.g., Alabama ex rel. Gallion v. Rogers, 187 F. Supp. 848 (M.D. Ala. 
1960), affd. per curiam, 285 F.2d 430 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 366 U.S. 913 (1961) 
(involving Title III of the Civil Rights Act of 1960). Cf. ALI STUDY, supra note 17, 
at 167: 
Where the difficulty is not misunderstanding of federal law, but lack of 
sympathy-or even hostility-toward it, there is a marked advantage in pro• 
viding an initial federal forum. Such attitudes are perhaps less common among 
federal judges, chosen and paid by the national government, and enjoying the 
protection of life tenure, than they are in the state judiciary. 
77. See, e.g., McClung v. Silliman, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 598 (1821). See also 
Armand Schmoll, Inc. v. Federal Reserve Bank, 286 N.Y. 503, 37 N.E.2d 225 (1941), 
cert. denied, 315 U.S. 818 (1942). 
78. See, e.g., Pennsylvania Turnpike Commn. v. McGinnes, 179 F. Supp. 578 
(E.D. Pa. 1959), affd. per curiam, 278 F.2d 330 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 820 
(1960); Ex parte Scliockley, 17 F.2d 133 (N.D. Ohio 1926). 
19. Exclusive Jurisdiction, supra note 7, at 516. 
80. For example, in the fields of patent, bankruptcy, and antitrust law. See ALI 
STUDY, supra note 17, at 164-65. 
81. Id. at 166-67. 
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the Federal Employers Liability Act seems to bear out this conclu-
sion. The fact that the Supreme Court has granted certiorari in 
many more cases adjudicated in state courts than federal courts tends 
"to indicate that the lower federal courts adapted more readily to the 
Supreme Court's decisions as to the meaning of negligence under 
the act, and the sufficiency of the evidence to create a jury issue, 
than did state courts."82 
Another factor to be considered by the courts is whether the 
need for uniformity in application of the statute in question requires 
that jurisdiction be vested exclusively in federal courts._83 The most 
significant factor in this inquiry is the nature of the federal statute 
creating the particular cause of action. In other words, a court 
should determine whether the federal statute is likely to provide the 
judiciary wide latitude in developing federal rights, or whether the 
cause of action is sufficiently detailed in its scope and clear as to 
its purpose that the likelihood of future judicial gloss is comparatively 
limited. A clear illustration of the former is section 1 of the Sher-
82. Id. at 166. This is not to suggest that in the case of the PELA, where 
Congress made an express determination that jurisdiction over claims arising under 
the Act should be concurrent, Congress made an unwise policy decision. For, 
"[w]hen a large number of cases are expected to arise under a particular statute-for 
example, the PELA-efficient distribution of the case burden suggests that exclusive 
jurisdiction is inappropriate." Exclusive Jurisdiction, supra note 7, at 516. The 
PELA situation merely exemplifies the fact that, as a general proposition, greater 
uniformity is likely to result when federal claims are adjudicated in federal courts. 
This is not to say that the need for uniformity should be the controlling consideration 
in every context. 
83. See ALI STUDY, supra note 17, at 166: "It would seem a priori that lack of 
uniformity in the application of federal law stemming from misunderstandings as to 
that law, and the body of decisions construing it, would be less in the federal courts 
than in the state courts." See also Cullisen, State Courts, State Law, and Concurrellt 
Jurisdiction of Federal Questions, 48 IOWA L. REV. 230 (1963 ). It should be noted 
that the ALI Study's comments are directed to the question of whether federal courts 
should have original, not exclusive, jurisdiction in certain areas. Nevertheless, the 
distinction is one of degree, and the Study's discussion is equally relevant to the 
question whether federal courts should have exclusive jurisdiction in a particular area. 
When Congress is silent on the question of state court jurisdiction, the courts, under 
the approach suggested here, should engage in creative lawmaking. When Congress 
has properly exercised its lawmaking powers in this area and proclaimed jurisdiction 
to be exclusive in certain classes of cases, it "has seemingly made a judgment that 
there is a national interest in uniform construction of the applicable law, and is 
[therefore] unwilling to permit the litigants to choose a state forum." ALI SnmY, 
supra note 17, at 478. 
The courts in exercising their lawmaking functions when Congress is silent may 
make the same determination-namely, that the need for uniformity in a particular 
context is so great that jurisdiction should be found exclusive. 
[E]ven if both parties had an opportunity to choose the federal system in every 
case [even if there was an initial federal forum available], the need for exclu-
siveness would still not be wholly eliminated. At least in the fields of patent 
and antitrust law, the interests to be protected go beyond those of the parties 
to the suit. 
Exclusive Jurisdiction, supra note 7, at 513. 
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man Act, 84 which by its own terms and subsequent judicial interpre-
tation85 has provided the courts with considerable authority to fash-
ion the law of restraint of trade as they see fit. An example of the 
latter might be the Truth in Lending Act,80 which is quite explicit, 
in many of its provisions, as to the scope of the federal right pro-
vided. 
The relevance of this criterion in determining the need for uni-
formity is quite apparent, for to the extent that a statutory right de-
pends upon judicial development for its content, the danger of legal 
chaos will vary directly with the number of courts independently 
interpreting the right. In light of the fact that an overworked Su-
preme Court87 is capable of providing a uniform practice for only 
a fraction of the numerous issues of federal law that arise each year, 
the danger of divergent judicial interpretations must be taken seri-
ously. 88 
Such divergence is likely to be harmful for several reasons. 
First, to the extent that varying or contrary interpretations are given 
in different areas of the nation, the nationally unifying force of fed-
eral law is undermined, and the post-Civil War development of fed-
P,ral supremacy over local interests is weakened. Second, the arbi-
trariness of the enjoyment of federal rights that this divergence 
84. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1970): "Every contract, combination in the form of trust or 
otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, 
or with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal." 
85. See Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 69-70 (1911 ). 
86. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1681 (1970 & Supp. V 1975). The provisions of the Act 
are clearly more specific than the "restraint of trade" language in the Sherman Act. 
See note 84 supra. However, it should be kept in mind that what is involved here is a 
question of degree. Statutes like the Truth in Lending Act, though more elaborate 
than the Sherman Act, will still require extensive judicial interpretation. It can 
nevertheless safely be said that judicial lawmaking will be restricted in direct 
proportion to the specifics of the statutory scheme. 
Another relevant consideration may well be whether the statutory scheme provides 
for administrative regulations to implement the statute. To the extent that such 
regulations do accompany the particular statute, the amount of discretion left to the 
court will decrease accordingly. See, e.g., Regulation Z, 12 C.F.R. § 226 (1975), 
which implements the Truth in Lending Act. 
87. Kurland, Jurisdiction of the United States Supreme Court: Time for a 
Change?, 59 CORNELL L. REV. 616, 619-23 (1974). See also STUDY GROUP ON 
CASE LoAD OF THE SUPREME COURT, FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, REPORT 9 (1972). 
88. It is true, of course, that even a finding of exclusive federal jurisdiction will 
not insure uniformity of interpretation. Nevertheless, the likelihood of varying 
interpretations of federal law, both in terms of degree and occurrence, is substantially 
reduced when only federal courts are making the interpretations. Since there arc 
only eleven courts of appeals which, though not bound by decisions of other 
circuits, generally give them significant weight, and since a common basis for the 
Supreme Court's decision to grant certiorari is the existence of a conflict among the 
circuits, the danger of proliferation is considerably reduced. See ALI STUDY, supra 
note 17, at 166-67; Exclusive Jurisdiction, supra note 7, at 512, 
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would produce presents a significant moral problem. Would it be 
fair, for example, for a Colorado resident to receive a favorable in-
terpretation of federal law from his state court, while a Michigan 
resident receives a· contrary analysis of the same federal right from 
the Michigan courts? Such a distinction would be dependent upon 
the totally fortuitous circumstance of the individual's residence, a fac-
tor that presumably was in no way intended to influence the enjoy-
ment of the federal right in question. 89 Finally, in many cases the 
proliferation of judicial interpretations of a federal right will unduly 
undermine the predictability in enforcement of that right, thereby 
interfering with the often significant planning of primary commer-
cial, social, or personal conduct and decision-making.90 
Where, on the other hand, a federal statute is comparatively clear 
in its directives, the danger of varying or contrary judicial interpre-
tations is presumably reduced, even if the number of courts inter-
preting the right is substantial. Barring complications due to a lack 
of sufficient expertise (already considered as a relevant factor in de-
termining implied exclusivity),91 it is less likely that judicial interpre-
tations of a tightly drawn statute will vary to any great extent.92 
The relevance of the need for uniformity in deciding whether 
a particular cause of action is to be deemed exclusively federal casts 
doubt upon the soundness of the Court's conclusion in Dowd that sec-
tion 301(a) of the Labor Management Relations Act was intended 
to establish concurrent, rather than exclusive, jurisdiction. On its 
face, section 30l(a) is unclear as to whether it was intended merely 
to provide a forum in federal court for the adjudication of state-cre-
ated causes of action for breach of labor agreements, or, instead, to 
establish a new substantive federal common law in the area, to be 
fashioned by the courts. In Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln 
89. It might be argued that a similar danger of arbitrariness exists when different 
suits on the same issue are brought in different federal district courts. However, for 
the reasons mentioned in note 88 supra, the dangers are considerably reduced when 
suit is brought in federal, rather than state, court. 
90. The importance of these interests has been recognized in other contexts. Cf. 
Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 475-77 (1965) (Harlan, J., concurring). 
91. See text at notes 74-82 supra. 
92. It should be emphasized that the considerations urged here to influence a 
judicial finding of implied exclusivity are by no means intended to undermine the well 
established rule that, in adjudicating state causes of action, state courts are bound to 
interpret and apply relevant principles of federal law. See note 1 supra. It is true 
that the need for expertise and the danger of proliferation are affected as much when 
a state court interprets federal law in the course of a state adjudication as when a state 
court hears a federal cause of action. Cf. Lear v. Adkins, 395 U.S. 653 (1960). In 
the former situation, however, having the state court interpret federal law is a 
necessary evil since the only alternative would be the potential demise of federal 
supremacy. 
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Mills, 03 however, a majority of the Supreme Court had held that sec-
tion 301(a) was, as petitioner in Dowd argued, "more than jurisdic-
tional-that it authorizes federal courts to fashion, from the policy 
of our national labor laws, a body of federal law for the enforcement 
of agreements within its ambit."04 Petitioner in Dowd reasoned-
quite logically, it would seem-that if chaos were to be averted in 
the evolution of the federal common law of labor agreements, juris-
diction under section 301(a) must necessarily be exclusively federal. 
Despite this . seemingly persuasive argument for uniformity, the 
Dowd Court responded that "whatever the merits of this argument 
as a matter of policy, we find nothing to indicate that Congress 
adopted such a policy in enacting section 301."05 Dowd may thus 
present an instance where use of an approach tied more to general 
pragmatic factors than to the specific intent found in legislative his-
tory would have produced a different result. 00 
As a counterweight to factors calling for exclusive federal jurisdic-
tion, courts should consider factors that militate in favor of concurrent 
jurisdiction over a federal statutory claim. For example, if the number 
of claims under the statute is likely to be burdensome, a court might 
properly find jurisdiction to be concurrent, in order to distribute the 
projected case load among the federal and state judicial systems. 97 
Also, situations might arise where it is advisable, for the conven-
ience of the parties, to increase the number of available forums. 
In addition, there may be situations where state courts have gained 
considerable experience by enforcing similar state laws and are thus 
likely to be familar with and less antagonistic to a comparable federal 
93. 353 U.S. 448 (1957). 
94. Charles Dowd Box Co. v. Courtney, 368 U.S. 502, 506 (1962). 
95. 368 U.S. at 507. 
96. A possible explanation for the apparent discrepancy in Dowd between logic 
and pragmatism on the one hand and legislative history on the other is the questiona-
ble basis of the Lincoln Mills decision itself. The language of section 301(a) 
certainly suggests that Congress intended only the provision of a federal forum for the 
adjudication of state-created rights. The legislative history relied upon by Justice 
Douglas, speaking for the Court, to support the conclusion that section 301 (a) was 
designed to establish a new federal law of labor agreements was speculative, to say the 
least. See Bickel & Wellington, supra note 60, at 35-37; Note, Federal Common Law, 
82 HARv. L. REV. 1512, 1531-35 (1969). In dissent, Justice Frankfurter listed in 
an appendix persuasive evidence that Congress intended nothing more than the pro-
vision of a forum. 353 U.S. 448, 485-546. 
The legislative history relied on by Justice Stewart in Dowd not only supports 
his conclusion that jurisdiction under section 301 (a) was intended to be concurrent 
but also indicates that section 301 (a) was not intended to establish a federal common 
law of labor agreements. See 368 U.S. at 507. 
97. See Exclusive Jurisdiction, supra note 7, at 516. 
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statute. 98 The presence of these or similar factors is hardly conclu-
sive, however, for the mere fact that concurrent jurisdiction leaves 
a federal forum open may not be sufficient to protect the important 
federal interests embodied in a particular federal statute. For, in 
the words of one commentator, "even if both parties had an oppor-
tunity to choose the federal system in every case, the need for ex-
clusiveness would still not be wholly eliminated. At least in the 
fields of patent and antitrust law the interests to be protected go be-
yond those of the parties to the suit."99 In the last analysis, "when 
the interests involved are broader than those of the parties to the 
suit and the need for experienced determination is great . . . the 
legislative purpose may be most effectively accomplished by a grant 
of exclusive jurisdiction."100 
Although the foregoing discussion of the types of factors a court 
should consider is not intended to be exhaustive, it does suggest that 
a case-by-case approach along these lines is more likely to produce 
a rational and efficient allocation of jurisdiction over federal statutory 
claims than is the traditional practice under the amorphous Claflin 
approach. 
3. A Combination Approach 
It is possible that the optimum approach could be achieved by 
conducting, on a case-by-case basis, both an examination of the legis-
lative history101 and an inquiry into the needs of the federal system 
that are relevant to the determination of impliedly exclusive federal 
jurisdiction. 
Exactly how these two factors are to be combined will depend 
on their relative weight in each instance. If, for example, the legis-
98. It has been suggested, for example, that under section 27 of the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78aa (1970), jurisdiction should be made 
concurrent rather than exclusive. See Exclusive Jurisdiction, supra note 7, at 515. See 
also ALI STUDY, supra note 17, at 183-84. Similarly, it has been suggested that the 
antitrust laws, because of the fact that the state courts frequently enforce similar state 
laws, may fall within that class of cases where jurisdiction might appropriately be 
made concurrent. Exclusive Jurisdiction, supra note 7, at 515. However, the ALI 
Study, though conceding that the need for exclusivity may be less in the antitrust area 
than in the area of patents and copyrights, nevertheless concludes that jurisdiction 
should be exclusive since the federal interest embodied in the antitrust laws is "more 
important than the wishes of the parties." ALI STUDY, supra note 17, at 183, 478. 
99. Exclusive Jurisdiction, supra note 7, at 513. Another "factor ... frequently 
relied upon in support of concurrent jurisdiction-that a choice of courts will give the 
plaintiff a greater opportunity to procure inexpensive, speedy resolution of his 
claim-does not appear to be of major importance at the present time." Id. at 517. 
100. Id. at 517. 
101. Cf. R. DICKERSON, supra note 71, at 169: "Most if not all appropriate uses 
of legislative history may be justified . . . as part of the act of judicial crea-
tion •••. " 
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lative history is reasonably clear that Congress intended jurisdiction 
to be concurrent, a court would have to discover exceptional circum-
stances of a pragmatic character to justify rejection of the apparent 
inference to be drawn from the legislative history. If, as is more 
likely, 102 the legislative history is either silent or internally contra-
dictory, the court would be permitted considerably greater freedom 
to make its own inquiry into the needs of federalism. 
It would be incorrect to suggest that such a procedure provides 
the judiciary such latitude that it will act as a "super-legislature." 
The courts would be engaging only in a well-accepted form of stat-
utory construction in determining "how the legislature would have 
handled the matter had it been brought to its attention and had the 
legislature acted rationally and consistently."103 The likelihood that 
such a practice would stray substantially from congressional will is 
minimal, for "a rational court and a rational legislature would pre-
sumably apply the same basic standard: What fits best with the rest 
of-the statutory and legal system?"104 
It may be useful at this stage to examine cases where courts have 
attempted to provide a reasoned justification for their conclusions as 
to whether congressional silence in a particular jurisdictional grant 
should be read to make jurisdiction exclusive or concurrent, and to 
contrast the approaches taken in those cases with the one suggested 
here. In Alabama ex rel. Gallion v. Rogers,105 the issue was 
whether state courts had jurisdiction to enjoin the Attorney General 
of the United States from inspecting and copying voting records. 
Title III of the Civil Rights Act of 1960100 permits the Attorney 
General to compel production of such voting records; the Act ex-
pressly vests jurisdiction in the federal courts but is silent on the 
question of state court jurisdiction.107 The district court, resting on 
two grounds, concluded that the state court was without jurisdiction. 
First, to allow the state court to issue such an injunction would be 
102. However, it should be noted that commentators have even questioned the 
reliability of such acts as the rejection of an amendment to proposed legislation. Id. 
at 160. Cf. Copra v. Suro, 236 F.2d 107, 115 (1st Cir. 1956) ("There was extensive 
discussion on the floor, particularly in the Senate, but this history is subject to the 
usual infirmities, by way of ambiguity, of legislative debates."). 
103. R. DICKERSON, supra note 71, at 244. 
104. Id. 
105. 187 F. Supp. 848 (M.D. Ala. 1960), affd. per curiam, 285 F.2d 430 (5th 
Cir.), cert. denied, 366 U.S. 913 (1961). 
106. 42 u.s.c. § 1974 (1970). 
107. 42 U.S.C. § 1974d (1970): "The United States district court for the district 
in which a demand is made pursuant to section 1974b of this title, or in which a 
record or paper so demanded is located, shall have jurisdiction by appropriate process 
to compel the production of such record or paper." 
December 1976] Federal Causes of Action 337 
"in violation of the basic legal principle that state courts are without 
jurisdiction to review the discretion or enjoin the acts of federal of-
ficers."108 Moreover, the court reasoned, the grant of jurisdiction 
to the federal courts was intended to be exclusive: 
Section 305 of Title III of the Civil Rights Act of 1960 vests juris-
diction for the settlement of disputes under that Title in the federal 
district courts. There is nothing in the language or legislative history 
that permits the conclusion that the jurisdiction of the federal district 
courts is to be shared with the courts of the various states. Rather 
the entire history of the Act reflects that it was and is designed to 
provide a means of enforcing the basic federally guaranteed rights 
of citizenship ( to vote) against state action. It is apparent to this 
Court that Congress did not intend this jurisdiction to be concurrent 
with state courts, since such would be incompatible from the "par-
ticular nature of the case."109 
Though the Rogers court followed an approach closer to the 
combination approach advanced here than that adopted by most 
courts, its analysis does not contain detailed consideration of the fac-
tors that we have suggested are important. This omission precludes 
the case from serving as an adequate guide for future decisions. 
Ultimately, all the Rogers court did was to find shelter under the 
enigmatic language of the second branch of the Claflin test-that 
"such would be incompatible with the 'particular nature of the 
case.' " The court never explains what gives rise to the incompat-
ibility. The mere fact that "federally guaranteed rights of citizen-
ship" are involved is, of course, of little help, because all these cases 
involve some federally guaranteed right. Nor is the fact that the 
purpose of the federal right is to protect against state action sufficient 
in itself to remove state court jurisdiction, because state courts are, 
at least theoretically, as much obligated under the supremacy clause 
to prohibit illegal or unconstitutional conduct of state officials as are 
federal courts. It is likely that the court was concerned principally 
with possible state court hostility toward federal rights and the pos-
sible lack of state court expertise in enforcing and evolving federal 
rights of this nature. Perhaps interests of comity deterred the 
Rogers court from explicitly relying on these factors. But if the fed-
108. 187 F. Supp. at 852. See also Alabama ex rel. Patterson v. Jones, 189 F. 
Supp. 61 (M.D. Ala. 1960). But cf. Perez v. Rhiddlehoover, 247 F. Supp. 65 (E.D. 
La. 1965). 
109. 187 F. Supp. at 852 (footnote omitted). Cf. United States v. Louisiana, 265 
F. Supp. 703, 708 (E.D. La. 1966), affd. per curiam, 386 U.S. 270 (1967); Huson v. 
Otis Engr. Corp., 430 F.2d 27, 30 (5th Cir. 1970), affd. sub. nom. Chevron Oil Co. 
v. Huson, 404 U.S. 97 (1971) (suggesting that the federal courts are the proper forum 
for the adjudication of Outer Continental Shelf cases since the federal government has 
"exerted exclusive sovereignty" in that area). 
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eral interest analysis advocated here is to be successful, the judiciary 
must be candid in explaining conclusions of exclusivity. 
A decision somewhat more explicit in its use of pragmatic factors 
is Safe Workers' Organization v. Ballinger,110 where the court con-
sidered whether jurisdiction over a civil action for violation of section 
101 of the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 
1959m (the "Bill of Rights of Members of Labor Organizations") 
was exclusive. Section 102112 of the Act conferred jurisdiction on 
the federal courts but made no mention of state courts. The court 
relied on various factors, both practical and historical, in concluding 
that jurisdiction was exclusive. It first noted that another section 
of the Act was expressly concurrent, and from this inferred that sec-
tion 102 was intended to be exclusive.113 The court then stated that 
section 102, unlike other provisions in the Act involving "obligations 
already widely recognized and enforced by state courts,"114 "created 
new law and new rights" that should be developed by the federal 
courts.115 Additionally, section 102 was said to be analogous to the 
"economic bill of rights" in the Sherman Act, where jurisdiction has 
110. 389 F. Supp. 903 (S.D. Ohio 1974 ). 
111. 29 u.s.c. § 411 (1970). 
112. 29 u.s.c. § 412 (1970). 
113. 389 F. Supp. at 9-10. It should be noted that the court purported to apply 
the Claflin rule in this case. 389 F. Supp. at 910. However, its drawing of an 
inference of exclusivity from silence is inconsistent with the traditional rule that the 
primary presumption from silence is one of concurrent jurisdiction. The presence of 
an express grant of concurrent jurisdiction in one section and Congress' silence on the 
point in another seem to illustrate congressional inability to comprehend the implica-
tions of Claflin. The first test of Claflin postulates that congressional silence is 
generally to be taken to intend concurrent jurisdiction. Thus, if Congress had truly 
understood Claflin, it would not have felt it necessary to insert an express grant of 
concurrent jurisdiction in either section. 
114. 389 F. Supp. at 911. 
115. 389 F. Supp. at 910. Such a conclusion might be contrasted with the judicial 
treatment of section 301 (a) of the Labor Management Relations Act, where the 
Supreme Court found jurisdiction lo be concurrent even though it had also held that 
federal common law was to govern. See notes 64-67 supra and accompanying text. 
However, if the Court had not held in Uncoln Mills that federal common law was to 
govern, the decision in Dowd that jurisdiction was concurrent would be more easily 
justified. Nevertheless, the Court in Dowd should have looked to factors in addition 
to legislative history in order to reach its result. Justice Traynor, in McCaroll v. Los 
Angeles County Dist Council of Carpenters, 49· Cal. 2d 45, 315 P.2d 322 (1957), 
reached the same conclusion as the Court in Dowd but relied on· more criteria. He 
concluded that state court enforcement of section 301 (a) was not likely to frustrate 
any federal policy embodied in the Act. Moreover, he found no expertise justifica-
tion for exclusivity in this context since state courts have traditionally engaged in the 
interpretation and enforcement of contracts. Finally, Justice Traynor found no 
particular uniformity need for exclusive jurisdiction. While one might disagree with 
the analysis and conclusions of a court using the pragmatic approach, a more 
reasoned allocation of jurisdiction over federal causes of action is likely to result 
when a court is required to justify its jurisdictional conclusions. 
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been held exclusive.116 Finally, the court said that the history of 
the enactment of section 102 supported the conclusion that juris-
diction was intended to be exclusive.117 The Ballinger court's ap-
proach118 represents an improvement over an approach that, without 
adequate explanation, simply invokes one segment or the other of 
the traditional Claflin rule. 
4. Possible Objections to the Alternative Criteria 
There exist two possible objections to adoption of the alternative 
criteria (in particular, the combination approach) suggested here. 
Both stem from the vagueness inherent in a case-by-case analysis. 
On tlie one hand, it might be argued that such unpredictability un-
dermines the goal of introducing certainty into the planning of com-
mercial and social conduct. On the other hand, adoption of the ap-
proach suggested here might unduly burden the federal judiciary by 
requiring the courts to engage in a thorough examination of all the 
relatively ambiguous factors suggested here every time Congress 
fails to address the question of concurrent jurisdiction. 
Neither of these arguments merits the rejection of the suggested 
approach. Certainly, the current chaotic situation provides no more 
predictability than does the revised approach. The only alternative 
that might substantially increase predictability is the second option 
previously considered, 119 rejection of the implied exclusivity branch 
of the Claflin test in favor of universal application of the presumption 
of concurrent jurisdiction from congressional silence. Whatever 
benefit of predictability that might result from this approach is, for 
reasons already discussed, 120 outweiglied by its potenti?I harmful 
consequences. 
Moreover, the benefits of predictability in terms of planning 
primary conduct may be questionable. It is unlikely that much 
primary decision-making would turn on whether a particular stat-
utory right was to be adjudicated exclusively in the federal courts. 
In any event, whatever unpredictability may exist concerning a par-
ticular statute will likely dissipate when a judicial determination of 
116. 389 F. Supp. at 911. 
117. 389 F. Supp. at 911-12. 
118. Cf. Travel Agents v. Regal Cultural Socy., Inc., 118 N.J. Super. 184, 195-
99, 287 A.2d 4, 10-13 (Super. Ct. App. Div.), cert. denied, 60 N.J. 353, 289 A.2d 798 
(1972). 
119. See text at notes 60-62 supra. 
120. See text at notes 60-62 supra. 
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exclusivity is made at a comparatively early point in a statute's his-
tory. 
The argument based on judicial burden is equally unconvincing, 
for the Claflin test presently requires an examination of each statute 
to determine whether the cause of action is impliedly exclusive. 
The changes proposed here simply remove the presumption of con-
current jurisdiction and provide a set of standards with which to eval-
uate the statute. 
II. THE OBLIGATION OF STATE COURTS TO HEAR 
FEDERAL CAUSES OF ACTION 
To this point, we have examined the power of state courts to 
hear a federal cause of action when Congress has been silent on the 
question in the statute creating the cause of action. There can be 
little doubt, that, at the very least, if Congress explicitly confers juris-
diction on the state courts, those courts have the power to adjudicate 
that cause of action. The next logical question is whether state 
courts have an obligation to hear federal causes of action when Con-
gress explicitly grants the power or when the judiciary concludes that 
concurrent jurisdiction is appropriate. 
A. Compelling State Courts to Hear Federal Causes of Action: 
Constitutional Questions 
In considering a state's obligation to provide a forum for the ad-
judication of federal causes of action, the Supreme Court over the 
years has failed to distinguish between possible constitutional limita-
tions on congressional power, on the one hand, and self-imposed 
statutory limits intended by Congress to allow state courts to escape 
the burdens such an obligation would impose, on the other. Before 
proceeding to an analysis of the problems surrounding the question 
of congressional intent, then, it seems appropriate to discuss the 
doubts surrounding Congress' constitutional power to impose on the 
state judiciaries the obligation to provide a forum for the vindication 
of federal rights. 
Any theory that the Constitution itself limits congressional power 
in this area necessarily assumes that within the body of the Constitu-
tion lies some enclave shielding the states from the imposition of 
such burdens by the federal government. Some-albeit without 
specific reference to the language of the Constitution-have rea-
soned that such an enclave is total in its extent. The leading ex-
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position of this view appeared in Justice Frankfurter's concurring 
opinion in Brown v. Gerdes,121 where he argued: 
Neither Congress nor the ·British Parliament nor the Vermont Legis-
lature has power to confer jurisdiction upon the New York courts. 
But the jurisdiction conferred upon them by the only authority that 
has power to create them and to confer jurisdiction upon them-
namely the law-making power of the State of New York-enables 
them to enforce rights no matter what the legislative source of the 
right may be [assuming, that is, that jurisdiction was not exclusively 
vested in the federal courts].122 
Thus, in Frankfurter's view, Congress lacks the constitutional power 
to compel state courts to enfor9e federal causes of action. 123 
Though the case authority is not of much assistance in answering 
the question whether there exists a state enclave limiting congres-
sional authority in this area, 124 what little there is appears to be con-
trary to Frankfurter's analysis. It has, in fact, long been established 
that, at least under certain circumstances, Congress may impose on 
state courts the burdens of adjudicating federal causes of action.125 
What has not been adequately answered in the case law, however, 
is whether the Constitution imposes some limit on Congress' power 
to burden state courts in this manner. In Mondou v. New York, 
121. 321 U.S. 178 (1944). 
122. 321 U.S. at 188. 
123. For other cases reflecting the early view that Congress has no power to 
compel the exercise of jurisdiction, see Huntington v. Attrill, 146 U.S. 657, 672 
(1892) (dictum) ("[f]he courts of a State cannot be compelled to take jurisdiction 
of a suit to recover a like penalty for a violation of a law of the United States."); 
Robinson v. Norato, 71 R.I. 256, 260, 43 A.2d 467, 474 (1945) ("Instead of it being 
a question of what the states are obligated to do in furnishing a forum for litigating 
rights under a penal law of the United States, it is more properly a question of what 
Congress may do, under the Constitution, in conferring jurisdiction over such 
litigation upon the state courts.") (emphasis in original); Gibson v. Bellingham & N. 
Ry., 213 F. 488, 490 (W.D. Wash. 1914) (dictum) ("Congress cannot enlarge the 
jurisdiction of a state court, nor has it power to prescribe rules of procedure or 
methods of trial to be followed in a state tribunal"). 
The legislative history of the Sherman Act indicates that Congress at one time 
acted under the assumption that it did not have the constitutional power to confer 
jurisdiction on the state courts. See S. Doc. No. 147, 57th Cong., 2d Sess. 313 
( 1903): "It is not competent for Congress to confer a jurisdiction upon a state court 
any more than it is for a state to confer a jurisdiction upon a United States Court." 
124. C. WRIGHT, supra note 3, at 173. According to Professor Wright: "The 
Supreme Court has not yet considered whether Congress can require state courts to 
entertain federal claims when there is no analogous state-created right enforcable in 
the state courts." Id. See also Note, State Enforcement of Federally Created Rights, 
73 HARV. L. REV. 1551, 1556 (1960). 
125. See Testa v. Katt, 330 U.S- 386 (1947); Mondou v. New York, N.H. & 
H.R.R., 223 U.S. 1 (1912). Cf. Palmore v. United States, 411 U.S. 389, 402 
(1973): "[T]his Court unanimously held [in Testa] that Congress could constitu-
tionally require state courts to hear and decide Emergency Price Control Act cases 
involving the enforcement of federal penal laws." 
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N.H. & H.R.R.,126 the Supreme Court specifically held that Congress, 
in the Federal Employers Liability Act, did not purport to impose 
an absolute obligation on the state courts to enforce claims arising 
under the Act. Thus, the Court did not reach the question whether 
there were any constitutional limits on Congress' power to impose 
such an obligation. In Testa v. Katt,127 however, the Court never 
expressly stated that Congress, in enacting the Emergency Price 
Control Act, did not intend to impose an absolute duty on state courts 
to hear such claims; accordingly, the Testa Court's recognition of a 
"valid excuse" doctrine (that under certain circumstances a state 
court may decline to hear a federal cause of action)128 has given 
rise to speculation that there may be a constitutionally based state 
right to refuse to adjudicate certain federal causes of action. 120 
Absent controlling case law, one must determine whether the 
Constitution can reasonably J:>e read as creating an enclave for the 
states that the federal government may not invade. The language 
of the supremacy clause itself130 provides no limit of any kind on 
Congress' power to burden the state judiciaries. Any search for a 
constitutional state enclave, then, logically begins with the tenth 
amendment, which provides: "The powers not delegated to the United 
States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are 
reserved to the State respectively, or to the people." For a time, the 
Supreme Court read into the terms of this amendment what Professor 
Ely has called "a second line of constitutional defense [in addition to 
the limits of article I] against federal overreaching."131 
Until quite recently, modem theory had rejected this view of the 
tenth amendment132 because, as Professor Ely had asserted, the Ian-
126. 223 U.S. 1, 56-57 (1912). 
127. 330 U.S. 386 (1947). 
128. See text at notes 162-71 infra. 
129. See Note, supra note 124-, at 1554, where the author interprets the opinion in 
Mondou to suggest that, if Congress had purported in the FELA to impose an 
absolute obligation on state courts, there would be constitutional problems. 
130. See note 2 supra. 
131. Ely, The Irrepressible Myth of Erie, 81 HARV. L. REV. 693, 701 (1974). 
To exemplify this view, Professor Ely cites Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251, 276 
(1918), where the Court said: "Thus the act in a twofold sense is repugnant to the 
Constitution. It not only transcends the authority delegated to Congress over 
commerce but also exerts a power as to a purely local matter [manufacture] to which 
the federal authority does not extend." For examples of cases similar to Hammer v. 
Dagenhart, see United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1 (1936); Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 
298 U.S. 238 (1936); Hill v. Wallace, 259 U.S. 44 (1922). 
132. See Ely, supra note 131, at 701-02: 
[T]he enclave theory does not accurately reflect the Constitution's plan for al-
locating power between the federal and state governments. The Constitution in 
no way defines the content of any enclave of exclusive state authority-except, 
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guage of the amendment seemed to permit no other logical result. 133 
By its terms, the tenth amendment specifically reserves to the states 
only those rights not extended to the federal government. If, in im-
posing an obligation on state courts to hear a federal cause of action, 
Congress has exceeded its powers as enumerated in article I and the 
necessary and proper clause, a state would presumably be able to 
shield itself from the imposition of such an obligation by use of the 
tenth amendment. Yet if Congress has exceeded its article I power, 
the statute is unconstitutional regardless of the tenth amendment's 
existence. In the words of Professor Ely: "[l]t could hardly be 
clearer that the question of what matters are to be left exclusively 
to the states is to be answered not by reference to some state enclave 
construct but rather by looking to see what is not on the federal 
checklist."134 Hence the tenth amendment is seemingly of use 
when, and only when, it is not necessary. The inescapable conclu-
sion under this analysis is that the Constitution provides no special 
state enclave; the only constitutional protections open to the states 
are the limits imposed by the enumeration of Congress' power in 
article I, a safeguard of diminishing importance. 
The current validity of this analysis was brought into serious 
question by the Supreme Court last term in its decision in National, 
League of Cities v. Usery.135 The case involved a challenge by 
cities, states and intergovernmental organizations to the constitu-
of course, by a process of inference from what is not on the checklist of-federal 
power. 
See also E. CORWIN, THE CONSTITUTION AND WHAT IT MEANS TODAY 238-39 (1963), 
quoting United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 114, 123, 124 (1941) (citations 
omitted): 
The power of Congress over interstate commerce "is complete in itself, may be 
exercised to its utmost extent, and acknowledges no limitations other than are 
prescribed in the Constitution." ... That power can neither be enlarged nor 
diminished by the exercise or non-exercise of state power. • • • It is no objec-
tion to the assertion of the power to regulate interstate commerce that its exer-
cise is attended by the same incidents which attend the exercise of the police 
power of the state. . . . Our conclusion is unaffected by the Tenth Amendment 
which • • . states but a truism that all is retained which has not been surren-
dered. 
See also Sandalow, Henry v. Mississippi and the Adequate State Ground: Proposals 
for a Revised Doctrine, 1965 SuP. Cr. REv. 187, 207 n.84: 
Although congressional power to impose jurisdiction on state courts was denied 
as recently as 1944, see Brown v. Gerdes ... , Testa v. Katt would seem to 
suggest the contrary. In the absence of any express limitation upon Congress' 
power, its authority "to make all laws which shall be necessary and proper for 
carrying into execution" its enumerated powers would appear to provide adequate 
authority. The existence of such authority might be implied also from the fact 
that Article Ill permits, but does not require, establishment of federal courts in-
ferior to the Supreme Court, suggesting that Congress was to be free to make 
use of state judicial systems in the exercise of its powers under Article I. 
133. Ely, supra note 131, at 702. 
134. Id. 
135. 96 s. a. 2465 (1976). 
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tionality of the 1974 amendments136 to the Fair Labor Standards 
Act, 137 which extended the Act's minimum wage and maximum 
hour provisions to most state and local employees. In an opinion 
by Justice Rehnquist, a sharply divided Court138 invalidated the 
amendments in a decision apparently based on the proposition that 
Congress' power under the commerce clause does not extend to 
actions that unduly interfere with state sovereignty.139 
Exactly how substantial the invasion of state sovereignty must be 
before congressional action will be invalidated under Usery is not 
at all clear.140 In invalidating the 1974 amendments, the Court 
noted that "solely in terms of increased costs in dollars" the amend-
ments have caused "a significant impact on the functioning of the 
governmental bodies involved."141 The Court also noted that "the 
Act displaces state policies regarding the manner in which they will 
structure delivery of those governmental services which their citizens 
require,"142 and that "[t]his congressionally imposed displacement 
of state decisions may substantially restructure traditional ways in 
which the local governments have arranged their affairs."143 To the 
extent that Usery applies to congressional attempts to burden state 
courts, then, it appears that some ill-defined constitutional enclave 
might now be found to exist. It is likely that these limits would cor-
respond closely to the content of the "valid excuse" doctrine de-
scribed in the following section, 144 because these excuses are ac-
136. 29 U.S.C. § 203{d) (Supp. V 1975). 
137. 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (1970 & Supp. V 1975). 
138. Justice Blackmun filed a separate concurring opinion. 96 S. Ct. at 2476. 
Justice Brennan dissented in a highly caustic opinion in which Justices White and 
Marshall concurred. 96 S. Ct. at 2476. Justice Stevens dissented separately. 96 S. 
Ct. at 2488. 
139. It is one thing to recognize the authority of Congress to enact laws regu-
lating individual businesses necessarily subject to the dual sovereignty of the gov-
ernment of the Nation and of the State in which they reside. It is quite another 
to uphold a similar exercise of congressional authority directed not to private 
citizens, but to the State as States. We have repeatedly recognized that there 
are attributes of sovereignty attaching to every state government which may not 
be impaired by Congress, not because Congress may lack an affirmative grant 
of legislative authority to reach the matter, but because the Constitution prohib-
its it from exercising the authority in that manner. 
96 S. Ct. at 2471. 
140. It is sufficient to refer to the words of Justice Brennan in dissent, who 
expressed alarm at "the startling restructuring of our federal system, and the role (the 
Court] create[s] therein for the federal judiciary," 96 S. Ct. at 2485, and who noted 
that "there is an ominous portent of disruption of our constitutional structure implicit 
in today's mischievous decision." 96 S. Ct. at 2487-88. 
141. 96 S. Ct. at 2471. 
142. 96 S. Ct. at 2472. 
143. 96 S. Ct. at 2473. 
144. See text at notes 162-71 infra. 
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cepted by the courts in circumstances where reqmnng the state 
courts to hear a federal case would unduly burden state resources 
without serving an overriding federal interest.145 
It is by no means certain, however, that Usery will apply to all 
attempts by Congress to burden state judiciaries with the obligation 
to adjudicate federal cases. In a footnote, the Court stated: 
We express no view as to whether different results might obtain if 
Congress seeks to affect integral operations of state governments by 
exercising authority granted it under other sections of the Constitution 
such as the Spending Power, Art I, § 8, CI. 1, or § 5 of the Four-
teenth Amendment.146 
Indeed, in a separate decision last term, Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer,147 the 
Court upheld the amendments to Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights 
Act148 that prohibit state and local governments from discriminating 
in hiring against an attack under the eleventh amendment.149 No 
mention of the tenth amendment was made.150 
Though attempts by Congress to require state courts to hear fed-
eral cases will be based, in most instances, on the commerce 
power, 151 this need not always be the case. Congress might, for ex-
ample, have utilized its power under section five of the fourteenth 
amendment to require, explicitly or implicitly, that state courts hear 
certain kinds of civil rights cases. Thus, the precise reach of Usery 
remains unclear.152 
Regardless of the constitutional constraints that may exist, there 
may well be limits on the obligation of state courts to hear federal 
145. Basically, the "valid excuse" doctrine includes situations where a state court 
rejects a federal case on valid grounds of forum non conveniens, see Southern R.R. v. 
Mayfield, 340 U.S. 1 (1950), or because the state court in which the case was 
brought is a court whose jurisdiction does not include the type of case in question. See 
Herb v. Pitcairn, 324 U.S. 117 (1945); text at notes 166-67 infra. 
146. 96 S. Ct. at 2474 n.17. 
147. 44 U.S.L.W. 5120 (U.S. June 28, 1976). 
148. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (Supp. V 19-75). 
149. U.S. CoNST., amend. XI. The eleventh amendment has been interpreted to 
prohibit suits in Federal court by private citizens directly against a state. See Hans v. 
Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890). See generally HART & WECHSLER, supra note 3, at 
926-47. 
150. It appears difficult to distinguish logically among the exercise of different 
article I congressional powers for purposes of determining the scope of tenth 
amendment protection, as the Court intimated it might do in Usery. See text at note 
146 supra. Exercise of congressional power under section 5 of the fourteenth 
amendment, however, is arguably distinguishable, since the fourteenth amendment 
was, of course, adopted after the tenth, and to the extent the two are inconsistent, it 
can be said to have superseded the tenth. 
151. The Federal Employers' Liability Act and the Emergency Price Control Act 
are good examples. See text at notes 160-85 infra. 
152. See 96 S. Ct. at 2476-83 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
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causes of action, for Congress need not exercise its powers to the 
fullest extent possible. In other words, Congress may desire to pro-
vide the state courts an opportunity to decline to hear federal cases 
that is broader than that required by the Constitution. Indeed, the 
courts have often strained to infer from total congressional silence 
an intent to permit the states some opportunity for escape from a 
burdensome obligation to adjudicate a particular federal cause of 
action.153 
B. Compelling State Courts to Hear Federal Causes of Action: 
Deciphering Congressional Intent 
While Congress often indicates explicitly whether state courts 
have the power to hear federal causes of action, the question of a 
state's obligation to hear these cases is rarely, if ever, answered with 
a clear expression of congressional intent, either in the statute itself 
or in the legislative history. In most respects, then, courts consider-
ing the question will generally have to fend for -themselves in deci-
phering whether there is a particular congressional intent. 
One logical option is for the courts to assume, unless Congress 
specifies otherwise, that state courts are to have the power, but not 
the duty, to hear federal causes of action. While Congress can, de-
spite Usery, clearly impose some burden on the states, it may not 
intend to exercise its full power in all instances. It should be re-
called that the Court in Claflin v. Houseman154 framed the issue to 
be whether, in the face of congressional silence, a state court could 
(not must) entertain claims under a federal statute. The Court then 
concluded that a state court could enforce federal claims unless juris-
diction was found to be impliedly exclusive.155 
In support of this position, one might argue that if Congress in-
tends to exercise its supremacy powers by obligating state courts to 
hear federal cases, it should be required to say so explicitly. Pro-
fessor Terrance Sandalow has adopted such a position.106 While he 
concedes that "if the states are free to decline jurisdiction over fed-
eral claims and if they exercise that option, the resulting burden on 
153. Ely, supra note 131, at 706: "The fact that the state enclave model is not 
that of the Constitution need not, of course, imply that it is not a model Congress 
might by legislation impose on federal courts." This appears to be what the Court 
presumed Congress did in the Federal Employers Liability and Price Control Acts. 
See notes 160-61 infra and accompanying text. 
154. ~3 U.S. 130 (1876). 
155. See HART & WECHSLER, supra note 3, at 436; Note, supra note 124, at 1553. 
156. See Sandalow, supra note 132, at 207. 
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the federal courts may be extremely heavy,"157 Professor Sandalow 
nevertheless concludes that, "[i]n the absence of a declaration by 
Congress that state courts must enforce rights that Congress has 
created, there appears to be no substantial reason why the Supreme 
Court should impose such an obligation."158 Thus, under Professor 
Sandalow's view, even where a state court has the power to adjudi-
cate federal causes of action, it may refuse to provide a forum for 
the enforcement of these rights, absent an express declaration by 
Congress that it has an obligation to do so. 
In our judgment, the view that state courts should have the power 
to enforce federal claims without some accompanying obligation is 
inconsistent with the concept of federal supremacy that has evolved 
over the years. In giving state courts the power to adjudicate federal 
causes of action, presumably Congress (or, where Congress is silent, 
the court, necessarily exercising a lawmaking function) has decided 
that the substantive policies embodied in the federal statute creating 
the cause of action and the federal policies concerning the admin-
istration of the federal court system are best advanced by distributing 
the case burden between the state and federal courts. If the ·state 
courts could frustrate these federal policies by simply declining to 
adjudicate the federal claims, then the concept of federal supremacy 
would be considerably undercut. A second consideration is that, 
under such a system, each state judiciary would decide for itself 
whether to accept federal cases; thus there would be no way to regu-
late the allocation of burdens between state and federal courts. The 
resulting unpredictability in the federal judiciary's caseload could 
conceivably hinder congressional decision-making concerning the 
structure and jurisdiction of the federal courts. It therefore seems 
unwise to presume that Congress intended such a result unless, of 
course, it explicitly provides in the terms of a new statute that state 
courts are to be given the power but not the duty to hear federal 
cases.159 
157. Id. 
158. Id. (footnote omitted). Professor Sandalow is of the opinion that ·'[r]ecogni-
tion of congressional power to require the exercise of juisdiction by state courts would 
permit ample protection of any federal interests." Id. 
159. In Mondou v. New York, N.H. & H.R.R., 223 U.S. 1 (1912), and Testa v. 
Katt, 330 U.S. 386 (1947), the Supreme Court dealt with the issue of a state court's 
obligation to hear federal causes of action. In both cases, the Court held that the 
state courts could not decline to adjudicate the federal claims before them. The fed-
eral statutes involved in Mondou and Testa (the Federal Employers Liability Act and 
the Emergency Price Control Act, respectively) expressly vested concurrent jurisdic-
tion in the state courts, while Claflin was an instance of congressional silence on the 
question of state court jurisdiction. Thus, on their facts, Mondou and Testa are not 
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Thus; congressional silence should not be construed to authorize 
state courts to reject federal cases at will. However, Congress' si-
lence should be understood to permit state judiciaries at least some 
discretion to decline to hear federal causes of action. A series of 
decisions construing the Federal Employer's Liability Act (PELA) 100 
and the Emergency Price Control Act101 recognized such a power 
in the state courts under the heading of "valid excuse."102 Al-
though the Court had not been entirely clear on the matter, 
it was reasonable to assume that these decisions had construed 
only congressional intent, not the Constitution, in developing the 
valid excuse doctrine. In light of Usery, it is likely that much, 
if not all, of this doctrine will henceforth acquire a constitutional di-
mension. As a practical matter, however, the shift in thinking will 
probably make little difference, for neither the statutory language 
nor the legislative history have ever been of much assistance in con-
struing congressional intent on this question. Hence, if it believes 
it must interpret congressional intent, the judiciary will be forced to 
employ what we have previously termed "creative judicial lawmak-
inconsistent with a view that where Congress is silent a state court could have the 
power to hear federal claims but no duty to do so. 
However, the Court's opinion in Testa seems inconsistent with any attempt to 
distinguish the meaning of congressional silence in the two contexts. The Court in 
Testa apparently considered Claflin to have answered the question of the meaning of 
congressional silence in both the power and duty situation. See 330 U.S. at 391. See 
also Mondou v. New York, N.H. & H.R.R., 223 U.S. 1, 58 ( 1912) ("The existence of 
the jurisdiction creates an implication of the duty to exercise it ...• "). Although 
Testa and Mondou apparently extended the reach of Claflin beyond its original 
confines, see HART & WECHSLER, supra note 3, at 436; Sandalow, supra note 132, at 
204-05, their holdings seem to apply whether or not there is an express grant of 
jurisdiction to the state courts. Thus, Testa appears to dictate the conclusion that 
congressional silence would be interpreted in the same manner, regardless of whether 
the question presented is a state court's power or obligation to hear federal claims, 
This outcome necessarily leads to the further conclusion that where a state court has 
the power to adjudicate such claims, Congress has also intended to impose a 
corresponding duty to do so. 
For cases accepting the power-therefore-duty rationale, even when there is no 
express grant of concurrent jurisdiction, see Egner v. Texas City lndp. School Dist .. 
338 F. Supp. 931 (S.D. Texas 1972); Calpo v. Highway Truck Drivers, 201 F. Supp. 
307 (D. Del. 1961); Williams v. Horvath, 45 Cal. App. 3d 422, 119 Cal. Rptr. 413 
(1975); Maryland Comm. for Fair Representation v. Tawes, 228 Md. 412, 180 A.2d 
656 (Ct. App. 1962); Lewis v. Delta Loans, Inc., 300 S.2d 142 (Miss. 1974); Vogt 
v. Nelson, 69 Wis. 2d 125, 230 N.W.2d 123 (1975). 
160. See Missouri ex rel. So. Ry. v. Mayfield, 340 U.S. 1 (1950); McKnett 
v. St. Louis & S.F. Ry., 292 U.S. 230 (1934); Douglas v. New York, N.H. & H.R.R., 
279 U.S. 377 (1929) Mondou v. New York, N.H. & H.R.R., 223 U.S. 1 (1912). 
161. See Testa v. Katt, 330 U.S. 386 (1947). 
162. See Douglas v. New York, N.H. & H.R.R., 279 U.S. 377, 388 (1929) ("there 
is nothing in the Act of Congress that purports to force a duty upon such courts as 
against an otherwise valid excuse"). 
December 1976] Federal Causes of Action 349 
ing. "103 The courts will be required, in other words, to determine 
what Congress would have dictated had it considered the matter. In 
so doing, the courts can properly assume that Congress would have 
acted reasonably and would thus have generally accepted a legiti-
mate state excuse that neither discriminates against nor unduly inter-
feres with the enforcement of federal law. Though the newly dis-
covered constitutional state enclave has yet to be defined, it will 
likely be quite similar to the principle just described. Consequently, 
unless Congress were to attempt an explicit abrogation of part or 
all of the valid excuse doctrine, the source of that doctrine will prob-
ably matter little. 
Given our assumption that Usery will not alter most analyses in 
this area, what light have the cases shed on the question of exactly 
when a state court may properly decline to provide a forum for ·the 
adjudication of federal claims? First, the courts have not presumed 
that Congress, when it confers jurisdiction on state courts to entertain 
federal claims, intended either to enlarge the jurisdiction of a state 
court which, under state law, has limited jurisdiction, 164 or to compel 
the states to create courts competent to hear federal causes of 
action.165 Consistent with this position is the holding that it is a valid 
excuse to decline to hear a federal cause of action on the ground 
that the suit concerned a matter beyond the limited jurisdiction of 
the state court in which the case was brought. For example, in Herb 
v. Pitcairn166 the plaintiff brought an- FELA action in a city court 
of Illinois. Under the Illinois constitution, as interpreted by that 
state's highest court, a city court did not have jurisdiction to hear 
cases based upon a cause of action (whether state or federal) that 
arose outside the city. The plaintiff then moved for a change of 
venue to a court of general jurisdiction. In the interim, however, 
the two-year FELA statute of limitations had run. The Supreme 
Court upheld the state court's decision that, because the action had 
not been commenced in a court of competent jurisdiction as defined 
by state law, there was no cause to transfer under Illinois venue law; 
therefore, the case was properly dismissed because the federal stat-
ute of limitations had run. 167 
163. See text at note 72 supra. 
164. See, e.g., Mondou v. New York, N.H. & H.R.R., 223 U.S. 1, 56-57 (1912). 
165. See Note, supra note 124, at 1554 n.28. 
166. 324 U.S. 117 (1945). 
167. However, the Court issued a caveat: "The freedom of the state court so to 
decide is, of course, subject to the qualification that the cause of action must not be 
discriminated against because it is a federal one." 324 U.S. at 123. See Stein v. 
Aintablian, 100 N.Y.S.2d 90 (Sup. Ct. 1950), where the plaintiff brought suit in a 
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Permitting a state court of limited jurisdiction to decline to enter-
tain a federal cause of action beyond its scope would seem to accord 
with the apparent rationale of the valid excuse doctrine.168 In the 
first place, requiring such courts to hear federal claims would involve 
a serious infringement on the state's policies of judicial administra-
tion. Secondly, the "court-of-limited-jurisdiction" valid excuse ap-
pears to involve little or no conflict with federal policy. It would 
be extremely difficult for a state court to manipulate this excuse to 
avoid its obligation to hear a federal claim, since simple reference 
to state law will reveal whether a particular court is, in fact, a court 
of limited jurisdiction. Also important is the fact that this use of 
the valid excuse doctrine will generally not interfere with the federal 
government's allocation of the burdens of adjudication between state 
and federal courts, because the state courts of general jurisdiction 
will remain open to federal claims. Moreover, it is unlikely Con-
gress would want to entrust the development of federal law to courts 
that are by state law incompetent to hear the kind of cases that will 
arise under the statute in question. Hence, had it considered the 
question, Congress would likely have required that only state courts 
of general or compatible jurisdiction enforce particular federal 
claims. 
In addition to authorizing state courts to decline federal cases 
when their jurisdiction is "limited" by state law, some commentators 
have read the Supreme Court's valid excuse cases to authorize a state 
court of general jurisdiction to refuse to adjudicate a federal cause 
of action when it does not enforce "analogous" forum or foreign state 
created rights.169 It should be noted at the outset that none of the 
Supreme Court's state obligation cases170 explicitly employ the "anal-
county court under section 205 of the Housing and Rent Act of 1947, 50 U.S.C.A. 
app. § 1895{c) (1951), which provided for recovery of rent overcharges in a state 
court of competent jurisdiction. Although the county court was a state court, state 
law prohibited it from hearing cases involving claims for more than three thousand 
dollars. Since the plaintiff was seeking more than that amount, it was held that the 
county court could properly decline to hear the federal claim. See also Miller v. 
Municipal Court, 22 Cal. 2d 818, 142 P.2d 297 (1943). 
168. See text following note 161 supra. 
169. See, e.g., Note, supra note 124, at 1554-55. See also Sandalow, supra note 
132, at 205. However, it should be noted that Professor Sandalow, while acknowledg-
ing that the analogous right theory is predominantly accepted, does not himself 
specifically endorse this interpretation, and believes that the Court's decisions support 
a "broader doctrine." See note 195 infra. Professor Wright and Professor Hart 
describe as open the question whether Congress can constitutionally compel the states 
to enforce nonanalogous federally created rights. See C. WRIGHT, supra note 3, at 
173; Hart, The Relations Between State and Federal Law, 54 CoLUM. L. REV, 489, 
507-08 (1954); Note, supra note 124, at 1554. 
170. See cases cited notes 160, 161 supra. 
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ogous state-created" terminology when addressing the valid excuse 
issue. In fact, there is serious question whether the doctrine is any-
thing more than a product of commentators' unfounded speculation. 
The case support for the doctrine's existence is at best tenuous and 
at worst nonexistent.171 
The "analogous right" concept is apparently derived from lan-
guage used in the Court's opinion in Mondou v. New York, N.H. 
& H.R.R., 112 a case involving a state court's refusal to adjudicate an 
FELA claim. In M ondou, the Court said: 
We say [a state court is obligated to hear a federal case] "when 
its ordinary jurisdiction, as prescribed by local laws, is appropriate 
to the occasion," because we are advised by the decisions of the Su-
preme Court . . . that the Superior Courts of the State are courts 
of general jurisdiction, are empowered to take cognizance of actions 
to recover for personal injuries and for death, and are accustomed 
to exercise that jurisdiction ... 173 
This would appear to be a rather weak foundation upon which to 
build another block of the valid excuse doctrine. The language may 
reasonably be read to say no more than that state courts of general 
jurisdiction are required to hear federal claims; the language con-
cerning a state court's customary enforcement of personal injury 
claims may be no more than surplusage. 
Similar ambiguity appears in the later decision of Testa v. 
Katt, 114 a case involving a state court refusal to hear a Price Control 
Act claim. There the Court said: 
It is conceded that this same type of claim arising under Rhode 
Island law would be enforced by that State's courts. . . . Thus the 
Rhode Island courts have jurisdiction adequate and appropriate un-
der established local law to adjudicate this action. Under these cir-
cumstances the State courts are not free to refuse enforcement of 
petitioners' claim.115 
The Court's language is sufficiently unclear, on its face, that it may 
be subject to the interpretation that the Court contemplated two 
distinct justifications for a state court refusal to entertain a federal 
cause of action (neither justification was actually pres~nt in Testa): 
171. In his dissenting opinion in Dice v. Akron C. & Y. R.R., 342 U.S. 359, 364-
67 (1952), Justice Frankfurter stated in dictum that a state court need hear negli-
gence cases under the Federal Employers' Liability Act only if that state enforced its 
own cause of action for negligence. This appears to be the only explicit support in a 
Supreme Court opinion for the analogous right theory. The opinion of the majority 
did not deal with the question. 
172. 223 U.S. 1 (1912). 
173. 223 U.S. at 57. 
174. 330 U.S. at 386 (1947). 
175. 330 U.S. at 394. 
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(1) that the declining court is one of limited jurisdiction under state 
law or (2) that the state courts of general jurisdiction do not cus-
tomarily enforce state-created rights which are similar to those 
created by the federal statute. If by its language the Court meant 
to accept the second alternative, this would be tantamount to judicial 
acceptance of the "analogous right" theory. However, that the Testa 
Court intended only the former interpretation is evidenced by its 
direction176 to compare the Testa situation to that found in Herb v. 
Pitcairn.111 In Pitcairn, it will be recalled,178 the Court concluded 
that if a court is not a court of general jurisdiction, it has a valid 
excuse for refusing to adjudicate, so long as it does not discriminate 
against the federal claim. Hence, despite the ambiguity in its lan-
guage, the Testa Court probably intended nothing more than an 
affirmation of the "limited jurisdiction" exception. 
Further support of the analogous right doctrine's existence has 
been discerned170 in the Supreme Court's decisions in McKnett v. 
St. Louis & S.F. Ry.180 and Douglas v. New York, N.H. & H.R.R. 181 
Though the manner in which these decisions support the doctrine 
is not made wholly clear, the argument would likely proceed as fol-
lows: In McKnett, the state court had dismissed an FELA claim on 
the ground that a state statute permitted the state courts to entertain 
suits against foreign corporations based on causes of action under 
state law, but not under federal law. The McKnett Court held that 
the Federal Constitution prohibits state courts of general jurisdiction 
from refusing to [provide a forum] solely because the suit is brought 
under a federal law. The denial of jurisdiction by the Alabama court 
is based solely upon the source of law sought to be enforced . . . . 
A state may not discriminate against rights arising under federal 
law.1s2 
Since the opinion rejects a state court's power to decline to adjudi-
cate federal cases on the mere ground that they are federal cases, 
the argument presumably runs, McKnett implicitly approves a state 
refusal to hear a federal case if the rejection is based on something 
other than naked discrimination. The rejection of a federal case by 
a state court because it does not customarily enforce analogous state-
created rights is obviously based on a ground other than mere dis-
176. 330 U.S. at 394. 
177. 324 U.S. 117 (1945). 
178. See text at notes 166-68 supra. 
179. See, e.g., Sandalow, supra note 132, at 205. 
180. 292 U.S. 230 (1934). 
181. 279 U.S. 377 (1929). 
182. 292 U.S. at 233-34. 
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crimination against federal law; thus, the argument would apparently 
conclude, McKnett indirectly authorizes such rejection. 
The decision in McKnett, however, provides rather weak support 
for the existence of the analogous right concept. It is difficult to 
understand how M cKnett's rejection of a state court's power to dis-
criminate against federal law can be taken to constitute approval of 
a state court's power to decline to hear federal cases on another 
basis. The issue simply did not present itself, and the Court did 
not address it, even in dictum. 
Nor does Douglas in any way support the analogous right con-
cept. It is true that, unlike McKnett, Douglas "sustain[ed] the re-
fusal of a state court to exercise jurisdiction over a federal statutory 
claim under circumstances in which it would also have declined to 
adjudicate a state-created claim."183 But an examination of the 
Douglas holding, as well as later decisions recognizing similar types 
of valid excuses, underscores the significant differences between the 
theory upon which these cases were decided and the analogous right 
theory. 
In Douglas, the Supreme Court upheld a state court refusal to 
entertain an FELA claim on the ground that a state statute permitted 
discretionary dismissal of both federal and state claims where neither 
the plaintiff nor the defendant were residents of the forum state. 
Similarly, in Missouri ex rel. Southern Ry. v. Mayfield, 184 the Court 
upheld a state court refusal to adjudicate an FELA claim on the 
ground of forum non conveniens. Finally, in Barnett v. Baltimore & 
Ohio Ry.,185 a state court held that it could properly decline to adjudi-
cate a federal claim on the ground •that a suit between the parties was 
pending in a federal district court. 
The theory that traditional considerations of forum non con-
veniens justify the state courts' refusal to adjudicate federal causes 
of action appears to be sound. Admittedly, permitting state courts 
to decline jurisdiction for this reason produces a greater risk of abuse 
than the "court-of-limited-jurisdiction" excuse, because it is by na-
ture a discretionary doctrine. However, this excuse, unlike the anal-
ogous right excuse, is not established by reference to the nature 
of the substantive cause of action upon which a suit is based. Rather 
the considerations normally involved in a forum non conveniens de-
termination-"the ease of access of proof, the availability and cost 
of obtaining witnesses, the possibility of harassment of the defend-
183. Sandalow, supra note 132, at 205. 
184. 340 U.S. 1 (1950). 
185. 119 Ohio App. 2d 329, 200 N.E.2d 473 ( 1963 ). 
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ant in litigating in an inconvenient forum"186-remain the same 
whether the source of law to be applied is state or federal. Thus, 
the potential for state obstruction of federal interests is quite re-
stricted. Moreover, the necessary implication of a forum non con-
veniens decision is that the courts of another state would be more 
appropriate to adjudicate the case; accordingly, the federal interest 
in having a state forum open would not be frustrated, as it might 
be under the analogous right theory. Finally, as discussed more 
fully below, the legitimate state interest in avoiding undue burdens 
by means of forum non conveniens is considerably more substantial 
than the comparable interest in avoiding federal cases in which state 
courts are called upon to adjudicate nonanalogous rights. 
Case support for the analogous right theory has already been 
shown to be quite weak. Indeed, simply as a matter of policy, the 
application of such a theory is in no way warranted. As noted 
earlier, 187 the apparent purpose of the valid excuse doctrine is to 
avoid imposing extraordinary burdens on the state judiciaries without 
undermining the federal policy of having federal cases heard in state 
courts. Thus, in determining whether the analogous state-created 
right concept is an appropriate application of the doctrine, two ques-
tions must be answered. First, does the requirement that state 
courts enforce. federal rights not analogous to rights presently en-
forced in those courts unduly burden the administration of the state 
judicial system? Second, is acceptance of the analogous state-cre-
ated right excuse consistent with the limits that the Supreme Court 
has placed on the valid excuse doctrine-limits apparently designed 
to prevent state courts from interfering with federal substantive 
policy and frustrating the federal policies of allocating jurisdiction 
over certain causes of action among both state and federal courts? 
In answer to the first question, it is difficult to see how the obli-
gation to enforce nonanalogous rights unduly burdens the admin-
186. Goodwine v. Superior Ct., 63 Cal. 2d 481, 485, 407 P.2d 1, 4, 47 Cal. Rptr. 
201, 204 (1965). It has also been suggested that the courts place heavy reliance 
on whether the plaintiff is a resident of the forum in making the forum non 
conveniens determination: 
The plaintiff's residence is given great weight in most cases. If "the plaintiff 
is a bona fide resident of the forum state," the California court has stated, 
"forum non conveniens has only an extremely limited application." . . . In 
New York a virtually iron-clad rule that forum non conveniens would not be 
invoked if one of the parties to the action was a New York resident was only 
recently relaxed. 
R. CRAMTON, D. CuRRIE & H. KAY, CONFLICT OF LAws 600 (2d ed. 1975). Such 
emphasis on the plaintiff's residence provides a strong safeguard against abuse of the 
forum non conveniens excuse to frustrate the federal policy of having a state court 
open to the plaintiff for his federal claims. 
187. See text at notes 168-69 supra. 
December 1976) Federal Causes of Action 355 
istration of the state judicial system. It would appear to be no more 
burdensome to impose upon a state court of general jurisdiction a 
duty to hear a newly created federal cause of action than a duty to 
hear a new cause of action created by the state legislature. In this 
context, it is significant that the Court in Mondou, the case usually 
relied on to support this branch of the valid excuse doctrine, 188 re-
jected as an excuse the argument that it would be "inconvenient and 
confusing" to apply the federal standards of liability in FELA cases 
involving personal injuries and different state standards in others.189 
In the Court's words: 
[l]t is neither new nor unusual in judicial proceedings to apply dif-
ferent rules of law to different situations and subjects. . . . But it 
never has been supposed that courts are at liberty to decline cog-
nizance of cases of a particular class merely because the rules of law 
to be applied in their adjudication are unlike those applied in other 
cases.190 
Since we can see no purpose even arguably served by the analogous 
right excuse other than to protect the state judiciaries from the bur-
den of having to apply unfamiliar federal standards of liability and 
since the Supreme Court appears to have rejected this burden as a 
valid excuse, the analogous right concept would appear to bear no 
relation to the presumed protective purpose of the valid excuse doc-
trine. Hence, on this basis alone, the analogous right excuse should 
be rejected.191 
Even if one considers the protective purpose of the valid excuse 
doctrine to be furthered by the analogous right theory, it is still nec-
essary to determine whether allowing state courts to dismiss federal 
claims on this basis is consistent with the limits that the Supreme 
Court has placed on the valid excuse doctrine. The Court has long 
demonstrated that it will not allow a state court to decline to hear 
a case arising under a federal law because the state rejects the sub-
stantive policy embodied in that federal law. In Mondou, for ex-
188. See Sandalow, supra note 132, at 205; Note, supra note 124, at 1553-54. 
189. 223 U.S. at 58. 
190. 223 U.S. at 58-59. 
191. It is true, of course, that on occasion, due to the number or complexity of the 
nonanalogous federal cases that the state courts will ber,called upon to adjudicate, the 
burden imposed will be substantial. But the point to be emphasized is that the very 
same burdens-due to either number or complexity-may result from the requirement 
that state courts adjudicate analogous federal rights. In other words, the degree of 
burden will be unrelated to whether the federal cause of action in question is 
analogous or nonanalogous. The only inherent additional burden presented by the 
adjudication of nonanalogous rights is the state courts' presumed unfamiliarity with 
the law in question, long rejected by the Supreme Court as a basis for establishing a 
valid excuse. See Mondou v. New York, N.H. & H.R.R., 223 U.S. 1 (1912). 
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ample, where a state court had declined to hear an FELA claim be-
cause of disagreement with the policy embodied in the federal stat-
ute, the Court stated: 
When Congress, in the exertion of the power confided to it by the 
Constitution, adopted that act, it spoke for all the people and all the 
states, and thereby established a policy for all. That policy is as 
much the policy of Connecticut as if the act had emanated from its 
own legislature, and should be respected accordingly in the courts of 
the State.192 
Similarly, in Testa v. Katt,193 where the state court had refused to 
hear a Price Control Act claim on the ground that it was against the 
forum's policy to enforce nonforum created "penal" claims, the 
Court concluded that "the fact that [the forum state] has an estab-
lished policy against enforcement by its courts of statutes of other 
states and the United States which it deems penal, cannot be ac-
cepted as a 'valid excuse.' "194 Judged by this standard, there is 
serious doubt whether the analogous right concept can be allowed. 195 
For the fact that the state does not recognize a right analogous to 
the federal right in question may mean, in effect, that the state legis-
lature has, by its inaction, made a substantive policy decision that 
it does not wish to establish that kind of right. In other words, in 
many (though probably not all) instances, the state's failure to pro-
vide an analogous right represents the legislature's decision that such 
a right is not worthy of protection. This conclusion, in tum, will 
invariably represent the legislature's disagreement with the substan-
tive policy contained in the federal statute. Yet the Supreme Court 
has already held that such disagreement is not a viable basis for a 
state court's refusal to hear federal cases. Moreover, if state courts 
of general jurisdiction can refuse to adjudicate all federal causes of 
action that are not analogous to those presently enforced in those 
courts, there will be a total frustration of the federal jurisdictional 
192. 223 U.S. at 57. 
193. 330 U.S. 386 (1947). 
194. 330 U.S. at 392. The forum state in Testa did enforce forum-created 
"penal" statutes. 330 U.S. at 388. Hence, the holding in Testa is not factually 
inconsistent with the analogous right theory. See Sandalow, supra note 132, at 206. 
However, the Court's real concern in Testa was that a state court's refusal to enforce 
a federal claim because of its disagreement with federal policy would violate federal 
supremacy. As the Testa Court stated, "a state court cannot 'refuse to enforce the 
right arising from the law of .the United States because of conceptions of impolicy or 
want of wisdom on the part of Congress in having called into play its lawful 
powers.' " 330 U.S. at 393. 
195. Professor Sandalow, while acknowledging the conventional wisdom that the 
Supreme Court's valid excuse cases have established "that a state must enforce a 
federally created right if it enforces analogous forum-created rights," Sandalow, supra 
note 132, at 205, has also noted the importance of the Court's federal supremacy 
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policy that the caseload created by a particular federal cause of 
action should be shared by the two judicial systems.196 
Thus, it would seem that a state court should not escape its su-
premacy clause obligation to enforce a federally created right by 
simply refusing to enforce analogous state-created rights. First of 
all, the case authority relied on to support such an excuse is tenuous 
at best. Indeed, the case most frequently cited for the existence 
of this excuse, Mondou, appears to have expressly rejected it.197 
Because the requirement that state courts enforce nonanalogous 
federally created rights would not impose a very severe burden on 
the state judicial system, the analogous right excuse would not serve 
the protective purpose of the valid excuse doctrine. Moreover, even 
if this obligation were deemed unusually burdensome, the analogous 
right excuse should be rejected for two other reasons. First, in at 
least some cases, it permits the states to do precisely, though in-
directly, what Mondou and Testa have declared to be forbidden by 
the principle of federal supremacy-to refuse to enforce federal 
rights because of disagreement with federal substantive policy. Sec-
ond, acceptance of the analogous right excuse may result in a sub-
stantial frustration of the federal jurisdictional policy of having fed-
eral cases allocated between state and federal courts. 
reasoning in Mondou and Testa. However, he has taken a more expansive view of 
the potential reach of those decisions than that advanced here. In Professor Sanda-
low's words: 
Federal policy is the same whatever lines the state has drawn in defining the 
jurisdiction of its courts over local claims. If the state may not assert a policy 
at variance with that expressed by the federal Jaw . . . insofar as the local juris-
dictional rule prevents adjudication, it is to that extent under the reasoning of 
Mondou [and Testa] inconsistent with the policy underlying the federal claim. 
Id. at 205-06. Thus, apparently, in Professor Sandalow's view .the logical extension of 
the Court's reasoning in Mondou and Testa would be that a state could have no valid 
excuse for declining to adjudicate a federal claim. 
However, the Court has permitted the state courts to refuse to adjudicate federal 
claims under certain circumstances. See Missouri ex rel. So. Ry. v. Mayfield, 
340 U.S. 1 (1950); Douglas v. New York, N.H. & H.R.R., 279 U.S. 377 (1929). 
Hence the federal supremacy limits that the Court in Mondou and Testa has placed 
on state court refusals to adjudicate federal causes of action do not preclude all such 
refusals but only those that are based on reasons inimical to the federal substantive 
policy expressed by the federal cause of action or those that unduly impinge on the 
federal jurisdictional policy of having a state forum available to hear the federal cause 
of action. 
196. In contrast, the court of "limited jurisdiction" excuse and the excuse based 
upon the considerations of forum non conveniens have no such drastic impact on 
Congress' allocation of jurisdiction between state and federal courts. In the former 
case, the state courts of general jurisdiction are presumably still open to hear the 
federal claim. The / arum non conveniens excuse will only be available where the 
state court is clearly not the appropriate forum; in that limited class of cases, pre-
sumably, some other convenient forum is available to hear the federal claim. 
197. See text at notes 188-91 supra. 
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When, then, may a state court properly decline to provide a 
forum for the adjudication of federal claims? The above discussion 
indicates that there is a valid excuse for refusing to entertain federal 
causes of action only where there exists "an express and articu-
lated198 bona fide state policy relating to judicial administration,"100 
which does not discriminate against rights created by federal law and 
which will not likely be used to frustrate the congressional policy of 
having federal claims heard in state court. 200 In those cases where 
a valid excuse was found-Pitcairn, Douglas, Mayfield and Bar-
nett-the state courts justified their dismissals on grounds relating 
to the administration of their state judicial system, and those grounds 
were equally applicable to claims based on federal and state rights. 
On the other hand, where no valid excuse for the refusal to adjudi-
cate was found-Mondou, Testa and McKnett-the state courts dis-
missed either for reasons based on disagreement with the policies 
expressed by the federal act201 or on grounds that reflected patent 
198. B. CURRIE, SELECTED EsSAYS ON THE CONFLICT OF LAws 358 n.293 (1963): 
The Court has held that the time within which an action may be brought to 
enforce a federal right may not be shortened by state statutes of limitation and 
nonclaim, e.g. Cox v. Roth, 348 U.S. 207, 210 (1955), but in such cases the 
policy of the statute as one related to the administration of the courts (as op-
posed to one concerned with protection of the defendant) was not clearly as-
serted. 
If the policy underlying the statute was one of defendant protection, then it conflicts 
with the federal policy of defendant nonprotection. In such a situation, Testa teaches 
us that the state policy must be subordinated under the supremacy clause. 
199. Id. at 358. See Cullisen, supra note 83, at 239. 
200. It is conceivable that cases will arise where there would exist a "bona fide 
state policy relating to judicial administration" for refusing to adjudicate federal cases, 
yet such a refusal might well seriously frustrate the policy of distributing the caseload 
between state and federal courts under a particular statute. For example, a federal 
law might require adjudication of extremely complex issues or call for intricate judicial 
supervision of relief. It is not entirely clear, especially in light of the constitutional 
dimension added by Usery, how such a case would be decided. It is likely that in 
each case a careful balance would have to be struck. Such an approach suffers from 
the drawbacks of unpredictability and lack of guiding principles, but in striking this 
balance a court should keep in mind the obligations imposed on the state courts by 
the supremacy clause to enforce federal law, so that in close cases the presumption 
should be in favor of binding the state courts. In any event, cases that do not fit 
within the traditional categories of the valid excuse doctrine are likely to be rare. 
201. Testa v. Katt, 330 U.S. 386 (1947); Mondou v. New York, N.H. & H.R.R., 
223 U.S. 1, 57 (19'12) ("The suggestion that the act of Congress is not in harmony 
with the policy of the State, and therefore that the courts of the State are free to 
decline jurisdiction, is quite inadmissible."). See also B. CuRRIE, supra note 198, at 
358-59: 
When Rhode Island refused to entertain a consumer's action for damages under 
the Emergency Price Control Act . . . there was no declaration of a Rhode Is-
land policy relating to the administration of courts that was inconsistent with 
providing a forum. Indeed, if any policy basis for the refusal is discernible, it 
is one of hostility to the national price-control policy and a desire to protect 
local enterprise against sanctions that were deemed unduly severe. . . . The Su-
premacy Clause in such a case forecloses state social and economic policies. 
. . . The Supreme Court, in reversing, justly treated Rhode Island's refusal to 
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discrimination against the federal claim. 202 Moreover, although the 
Supreme Court does not seem to have decided the question, it should 
not recognize as a valid excuse a state court refusal to adjudicate 
a federal claim on the ground that it does not enforce analogous 
state-created rights. Even though there may be no discrimination, 
the very availability of this excuse will in many cases turn on the 
state's unwillingness to adopt and enforce state rights analogous to 
the federal right sued upon; thus the excuse, albeit indirectly, may 
permit the state to reject federal law because of disagreement with 
the substantive policies involved. 
CONCLUSION 
Though the two issues examined in this article may appear to 
involve very different case precedents and immediate questions of 
interpretation, they are significantly linked on a broader level. Both 
the "power" and the "obligation" questions ultimately turn on the 
same considerations of political philosophy and legal process. Un-
derlying both issues is the exercise of Congress' wide-ranging discre-
tion in allocating the adjudication of federal causes of action between 
state and federal courts. This congressional power is premised on 
the concept of ultimate federal supremacy, legally established in the 
supremacy clause and politically reaffirmed by the Civil War. 
Despite the importance of preserving Congress' control in these 
matters, the evidence is all too clear that in enacting substantive 
legislation Congress has, with comparatively few exceptions, given 
precious little consideration to questions of jurisdictional allocation. 
Though Congress has given somewhat more attention to the issue 
of exclusive federal jurisdiction (the "power" issue), its efforts in 
that area have not clarified matters sufficiently. Despite its lon-
gevity, the current judicial approach to congressional silence in a par-
ticular enactment is ill-advised. The Claflin doctrine-that con-
gressional silence will be understood to establish concurrent juris-
diction unless some special basis justifies a finding of federal exclu-
sivity-is inadequate for several reasons. First, the absence of any 
standard for determining implied exclusive jurisdiction prevents the 
test from providing a rational ordering of jurisdictional distribution. 
entertain the action as an attempt to interpose the state's own notions of wartime 
price-control policy. Its decision does not necessarily mean that, in the absence 
of an express directive from Congress requiring states to provide a forum for 
federal causes of action, a state policy grounded in good faith upon considera-
tions relating to the efficiency and cost of the local judicial system would be 
overriden. 
202. See McKnett v. St. Louis & S.F. Ry., 292 U.S. 230 (1934). 
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More importantly, the effectiveness of the Claflin test depends upon 
Congress' awareness that its silence will, in most cases, be taken to 
authorize concurrent state court jurisdiction for the federal cause of 
action in question. History has demonstrated, however, that Con-
gress' understanding of this point is erratic. Indeed, the second por-
tion of the Claflin test-the doctrine of implied exclusive federal ju-
risdiction-acknowledges that there may well be occasions where, 
despite Congress' silence, a finding of exclusive federal jurisdiction 
is essential to the development of federal law. Given the inade-
quacy of the present approach, our suggested alternative is a case-
by-case analysis that would look both to legislative history and to 
pragmatic considerations of federalism. 
Neither legislative history nor statutory language generally pro-
vides the judiciary with much guidance in determining under what 
circumstances Congress intended that courts be required to hear fed-
eral cases. The courts have generally assumed that the supremacy 
clause imposes on the state judiciary an obligation to adjudicate fed-
eral causes of action. It is not entirely clear under what circum-
stances Congress will be presumed to have permitted state courts 
to refuse to hear federal cases. 
As with the "power" issue, the judiciary should approach the 
"obligation" question by assuming that, if Congress had directly con-
sidered the matter, it would have attempted to preserve federal su-
premacy without unduly impinging upon state interests. Such an 
analytical approach will lead to the conclusion that state courts may 
validly refuse to hear federal cases only when (1) to do so would 
further a significant interest in efficient state judicial administration, 
(2) the refusal is in no way premised on state disagreement with 
principles of substantive federal law or the mere fact that federal 
law is involved, and (3) refusal will not significantly undermine the 
federal policy of alleviating the burdens on the federal courts by dis-
tributing the caseload between federal and state courts. 208 
To date, the Supreme Court has, for the most part, properly ap-
plied these criteria in determining the scope of the state courts' obli-
gation to hear federal cases, though commentators have complicated 
matters by reading into Supreme Court decisions the "analogous 
right" theory of valid excuse, a doctrine that finds little support in 
the cases and even less in policy. What the Court has not clarified 
is whether the valid excuse doctrine is a constitutionally imposed 
limit on Congress' power to burden the states or whether it is simply 
203. But cf. note 200 supra. 
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an inference of congressional will drawn from congressional silence. 
The Supreme Court's recent decision in Usery may be taken to mean 
that the valid excuse doctrine is constitutionally based. Although 
such a conclusion seems to misinterpret both the language and the 
policy of the Constitution, "constitutionalizing" the valid excuse doc-
trine will probably not have much practical effect, except in the un-
likely event that Congress were ,to attempt to abrogate all or part of 
it. 
The duties of the federal courts, in resolving both "power" and 
"obligation" questions, are considerably greater than many of those 
courts have recognized. Both issues present questions of construction 
of congressional intent on matters about which Congress may never 
have articulated a specific intent. Under these circumstances, the 
burden on the federal courts is clear: In each case, they must carefully 
consider how the interests of federalism will best be served and con-
strue congressional will accordingly. In so doing, the courts will be 
appropriately performing their creative law-making function, long 
recognized as a proper-and at times necessary-tool of legislative 
construction. 
